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Abstract - The paper disputes the negative conclusion of prof. Mandler on the thesis 
by Garegnani, Schefold, Parrinello that intertemporal general equilibrium theory too 
is undermined by reswitching and reverse capital deepening. The paper argues that 
Mandler’s conclusion rests upon highly criticisable assumptions that render the 
equations of intertemporal general equilibrium identical to those of general equilibria 
without capital goods. The Walrasian treatment of the capital endowment is criticized 
in Part I on the basis of its insufficient persistence, and of other ‘methodological’ 
criticisms that are systematically surveyed. In Part II it is shown through a numerical 
example that Mandler’s claim, that the assumption of a single consumer guarantees 
uniqueness of intertemporal equilibrium independently of reswitching or reverse 
capital deepening, rests on the absence of production of capital goods in the last 
period of the equilibrium; this assumption is thus revealed to be one of the tricks that 
prevents the existence of capital goods from changing the properties of the 
equilibrium relative to those of equilibria without capital. 
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1.  In this paper[
1] I try to contribute to the recent debate, whether the 
deficiencies of traditional neoclassical capital theory highlighted in the Cambridge 
controversies affect the modern, neo-Walrasian versions of general equilibrium 
theory that specify the capital endowment of the economy as a given vector. Hoping 
that what I shall say will help the debate to make some progress however small, I 
would like this effort of mine to testify my admiration for Professor Bertram Schefold 
and my gratitude for having learnt so much from him.   
The latest stage of the debate on this topic is Professor Michael Mandler’s 
entry “Sraffian economics (new developments)” in the second edition (2008) of The 
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. I leave aside here most of the claims of this 
contribution, many of which are criticisable, e.g. Professor Mandler’s insistence on a 
supposed “Sraffian indeterminacy”; his mistaken identification of Sraffa’s analysis 
with neoclassical full-employment steady states[
2]; his acceptance of a mistaken view 
criticized again and again by the “Sraffians”, the identification of the use of the 
notion of capital as a single factor with the aggregate-production-function models[
3]. 
                                              
1 I thank Profs. Enrico Sergio Levrero, Fabio Ravagnani, and Bertram Schefold for their 
comments, not all of which were heeded but all of which stimulated rewritings that I hope 
have improved the readability of the paper although lengthening it.  
2 Since this identification remains implicit, it may be useful to point out that on p. 804 
Mandler (2008) writes that “the particular way Sraffa and his followers have spelled out their 
long-run view of the economy, by requiring that relative prices be constant through time, 
undermines their ‘missing equation’ criticism: linear activity models with constant relative 
prices have determinate factor prices”. The last statement in this sentence is false unless one 
interprets it as referring to neoclassical full-employment steady states where saving 
propensities are such as to determine uniquely the interest rate ensuring a growth rate equal 
to the growth rate of the supply of labour. On the difference between long-period and steady-
state analyses cf. below, fn. 26?? 
3 He thus overlooks the dominance in the neoclassical tradition until at least the 1940s of 
long-period general equilibria, completely disaggregated but including (and needing) a value 
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These mistakes – already present in his previous papers – have been discussed in 
Garegnani (2005a) and in Fratini and Levrero (2007). I am interested here in his 
conclusions on my present topic. These conclusions are starkly negative on the 
import of the recent Sraffian criticisms of general equilibrium theory. Relying on 
arguments put forth in his 2002 and 2005 papers, Mandler dismisses as wrong the 
attempts by Garegnani (2000, 2003, 2005a, 2005b), Schefold (1997, 2005a, 2005b) 
and Parrinello (2005) to argue that reswitching and reverse capital deepening 
undermine, not only the older long-period formulations of neoclassical equilibrium 
theory relying on capital treated as a single value factor, but also intertemporal neo-
Walrasian general equilibria; his conclusion is that the standard neoclassical view, 
that multiple and tâtonnement-unstable equilibria can only be due to insufficiently 
“well-behaved”[
4] consumer preferences and in particular to heterogeneity of 
consumers, is fully correct: “Instability can arise in general equilibrium but it stems 
from the demand side of the model, not the failure of capital goods to aggregate” (p. 
804)[
5]; the possibility that of two steady states the one with a higher consumption 
per unit of labour has a higher rate of interest is dismissed as no cause of problems: 
“the move to a steady state with higher consumption per worker requires a sacrifice 
of consumption at some set of dates prior to arrival at the new steady state. The no-
free-lunch moral of neoclassical growth theory rears its head” (p. 814)[
6]. 
No doubt a reader who comes across these conclusions without direct 
knowledge of the contributions Mandler criticizes gets the message of a defeat of the 
critics. This message, I will try to argue, is misleading. It is true that one or two 
claims advanced by the critics appear not easily defensible; but the results at the basis 
of Mandler’s conclusions are of very limited relevance for the central question in this 
                                                                                                                                             
endowment of capital because the endowments of the several capital goods were treated as 
variables (as required by the uniform rate of return on supply price characterizing these 
equilibria) and therefore the equilibrium needed an endowment of capital consisting of a 
single quantity of variable ‘form’. This allows Mandler to avoid discussing the true 
analytical roles in the neoclassical approach of the conception of capital as a single factor of 
variable ‘form’ (Petri 2004, chs. 1, 3), and more generally the shift of neoclassical value 
theory away from the long-period method. This mistake of Mandler is particularly 
surprising, considering his presence at the 1999 Siena Summer School (Petri and Hahn 2003) 
where several interventions insisted on these points.   
4 The “well” in this term is of course an expression of attachment to neoclassical theory 
rather than a scientific term. The same goes for adjectives such as ‘counterintuitive’ or 
‘perverse’ used to indicate phenomena (e.g. a demand for a factor that increases when the 
factor’s rental rises) that are disturbing for the validity of neoclassical theory; they should be 
avoided.  
5 In the New Palgrave entry Mandler does not discuss equilibrium uniqueness; I base 
myself on his views on this issue put forth in Mandler (2002, 2005).  
6 This conclusion of Mandler again relies on taking for granted the full employment of 
labour, without apparently realizing that this assumption is rejected by the critics precisely 
on the basis of the implications of their criticisms, so to assume it in order to deny some of 
the critics’ views is illegitimate.                     
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debate, namely, whether the marginalist (or neoclassical, or supply-and-demand) 
approach to value and distribution is capable of a satisfactory treatment of capital.  
The point is that the results Mandler bases himself on rely on assumptions that 
eliminate the specificities of production with capital goods, and render the 
equilibrium equations as well as the adjustment process formally identical to those in 
models without capital goods, where all factors of production are non-produced and 
there is no interest rate (I will call ‘atemporal’ the equilibria of these models, but their 
precise nature needs discussion, cf. §11). The assumptions that I particularly intend to 
discuss are three:  
- First Assumption: it is legitimate to include given initial endowments of the 
several capital goods among the data of the intertemporal equilibrium (this obliges 
one to study stability via instantaneous recontracting processes that exclude the 
implementation of disequilibrium productions and exchanges);  
- Second Assumption: the equilibrium is over a finite number of periods after 
which the economy ‘ends’, that is, in the last period(s) there is no production of 
capital goods since these would be useless[
7];  
- Third Assumption: the adjustment toward equilibrium is, to use Mandler’s 
terminology, a ‘factor tâtonnement’ where for each vector of non-produced factor 
prices the quantities produced are assumed equal to the quantities demanded at 
minimum-cost prices (on the basis of incomes that assume that all factor supplies are 
bought), so disequilibria arise on the sole markets of non-produced factors or goods.  
Given these assumptions, as far as I can see the formal equivalence holds (I 
discuss the issue in §§11-13) and the theorems on uniqueness and stability valid for 
atemporal general equilibria hold for intertemporal equilibria too; thus Mandler, 
having implicitly made these assumptions, can contend that the additional assumption 
of a single consumer with a differentiable strictly quasiconcave utility function 
ensures uniqueness and tâtonnement stability of the intertemporal equilibrium, 
independently of whether the technology is such as to cause reswitching or reverse 
capital deepening[
8]. Two claims advanced by the critics are thereby questioned: 
                                              
7 The assumption of production in the last period of an exogenously given vector of 
capital goods is only a special case of this assumption, because these final capital goods are 
in fact treated like consumption goods demanded in fixed quantities.  
8 There is one formal claim of Mandler concerning comparative statics that I find it 
difficult to accept but is of secondary importance for the topic of this paper, so its discussion 
can be confined to a footnote. Mandler (2002 p. 217, 2005 p. 477) argues that, if consumer 
excess demand satisfies the weak axiom and the utility function of the representative 
consumer is concave, then in general equilibrium models an increase in the endowment of a 
factor entails a lower equilibrium rental of that factor. He forgets to add that such a 
comparative-statics result requires in addition that no good be inferior (Quah 2003). Anyway 
the possibility, that a greater endowment of a factor be associated with a higher equilibrium 
rental of that factor owing to some other good being inferior, is due to income effects, so it is 
not relevant for the issue whether “anti-neoclassical” results can emerge in general 
equilibrium models owing to the presence of capital goods rather than to income effects. A 
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Professor Garegnani’s (2000, 2003) claim of possible non-uniqueness of 
intertemporal equilibria in spite of absence of income effects (I discuss it in §§11-12); 
and Professor Schefold’s (1997, 2005a) claim of possible instability of the ‘factor 
tâtonnement’ (which he calls Recursive-Samuelson tâtonnement) when the single-
consumer intertemporal equilibrium includes a ‘perverse’ technology switch (I do not 
discuss this claim because I leave stability issues aside in this paper; I only note, first, 
that Mandler (2008) does not refute Schefold’s (2005b) rejoinder, in particular 
Schefold’s claim that he has demonstrated the possibility of a local instability and 
that “the loss of local stability is crucial, even if there is global stability all the same, 
for global stability means little if wages may go to zero in the process of adaptation” 
(p. 504), and second, that the relevance of the ‘factor tâtonnement’ is highly doubtful, 
cf. below, §§ 3 and 9).  
But the critics had also advanced criticisms of the assumptions behind 
Mandler’s contention, and these criticisms Mandler avoids discussing. Thus 
Garegnani explicitly criticizes the First Assumption in (2000, pp. 410-11; 2003, p. 
127; 2005a, pp. 417-28), and his insistence on the need for an explicit consideration 
of savings-investment adjustments is a criticism of the Third Assumption; Professor 
Parrinello agrees with Garegnani on the need to reject the Third Assumption to make 
room for savings-investment markets; and Schefold insists that a ‘factor tâtonnement’ 
is only one possible way – and a very unrealistic one, that assumes a ‘perfect planner’ 
(2005b, p. 509) – to conceive adjustments on the basis of the first two assumptions, 
and he proposes as a possible alternative an ‘uninformed auctioneer’ (2005a, p. 467; 
2005b, p. 508 fn. 6) that violates the Third Assumption. 
Now, those assumptions are clearly questionable and the implications of 
dropping them should not have been left undiscussed by Mandler. All one gets from 
him is: “Perhaps in a more realistic setting [than the ‘factor tâtonnement’] the 
paradoxes of capital theory will turn out to be a distinct source of instability – but the 
case remains to be made.” (Mandler 2008, p. 813) The implicit admission of scarce 
realism of the ‘factor tâtonnement’ must be appreciated, but unfortunately neither he 
nor other neoclassical economists appear interested in exploring the possible 
consequences of “a more realistic setting” for economies with heterogeneous 
capital[
9].  
                                                                                                                                             
different comparative statics issue, more relevant to the debate but still to be explored, is that 
in intertemporal equilibrium models an increased endowment of labour cannot but mean a 
simultaneous increase in the endowments of many ‘nonproduced’ factors, namely labour 
endowments of several consecutive periods, a phenomenon with no correspondence with 
what is conceivable for atemporal models, and whose consequences on marginal products 
can be the most varied.   
9 There is a growing literature on non-tâtonnement adjustments, but with the single 
exception of F. M. Fisher (1983) none of these papers admits capital goods; and Fisher (as 
one might have expected on the basis of the considerations I will advance in §9) reaches no 
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In particular, dropping the fundamental First Assumption would cause an 
immediate collapse of general equilibrium theory, whose system of equations would 
become underdetermined. No doubt for this reason, neoclassical economists 
stubbornly avoid discussing this assumption in spite of the numerous articles and 
books criticizing it. I repeat the criticisms in Part I of the present paper, which does 
not advance novel arguments but may be useful nonetheless as a systematic summary 
that includes a mention of perhaps less widely known criticisms. This part concludes 
that the problems with the First Assumption suffice to discard the neoclassical or 
supply-and-demand approach to value and distribution. But in view of the deafness of 
the neoclassical side on this issue, in Part II I join the attempts to show that the First 
Assumption does not earn neoclassical economists a defensible theory anyway.  
So far these attempts have concentrated on stability but have not produced 
definitive results analogous, say, to the demonstration of the possibility of 
reswitching, apart from Schefold’s demonstration that one can observe reswitching in 
an intertemporal equilibrium (but, as mentioned, the implications of this fact remain 
to be assessed). The stability implications of the tâtonnement based on the 
‘uninformed auctioneer’ are still to be developed. Garegnani has not produced a 
numerical example proving the possible instability – on which he insists with 
arguments not without plausibility – of the savings-investment market(s) implicit in 
intertemporal models independently of ‘badly behaved’ consumer preferences. 
Parrinello has proposed a different tâtonnement that again explicitly embodies a 
savings-investment market but he has not proved that it can generate instability in 
cases where the standard tâtonnement would be stable.  
Anyway there is a general problem with studies of the stability of 
intertemporal equilibria: the difficulty of producing adjustment processes that grant 
the First Assumption and complete futures markets and yet preserve a relevance for 
the understanding of real market economies, a “thorny question” as Schefold puts it 
(2005b, pp. 511). My considerations in Part I, especially in §§ 3 and 9, certainly do 
not reduce the difficulty and may even suggest that very different avenues should be 
explored, e.g. the application of Gintis’s (2007) approach to economies with capital 
goods.  
So I have preferred to concentrate on the implications on uniqueness of 
equilibrium of introducing at least some elements of “a more realistic setting”; and I 
have chosen to work on an issue so far little discussed, the implications of dropping 
the Second, rather than the Third, Assumption. In Part II of this paper, after a 
discussion of some claims by Garegnani, I argue with the help of a numerical 
example that, without the assumption that in the last period of a finite-horizon 
intertemporal equilibrium the production of capital goods is either zero or a fixed 
unexplained vector, the First and the Third Assumptions plus the assumption of a 
                                                                                                                                             
result supporting the neoclassical approach (cf. Petri 2004, pp. 48-50, 67-71), and has since 
given up studying the topic.                     
 6 
single “well behaved” consumer do not exclude the possibility of multiple equilibria. 
So the uniqueness result referred to by Mandler relies on excluding the undeniable 
existence of investment of endogenously determined composition in any period that 
one may choose to consider ‘final’ (but that cannot mean that the economy really 
ends there if one wants the theory not to be ridiculous); the moment such a limitation 
of the horizon up to which futures markets are assumed to exist is accepted (i.e. the 
moment the extension of the assumption of complete futures markets to an infinite 
number of periods is admitted to be nonsensical) and the existence is admitted of an 
investment component of final output whose composition is not determined in the 
same way as for consumption goods – a component that would not exist if there were 
no capital goods –, multiple equilibria can arise independently of consumer 
heterogeneity. This confirms the role of the Second Assumption as a neutralizer of 
the specificities of production with heterogeneous capital goods.  
 
PART  I 
 
2.  An important part of the Sraffa-inspired criticism of modern (neo-
Walrasian) general equilibrium theory is totally absent from Mandler’s entry: the part 
that points to what Garegnani (1990, p. 45) has called “methodological 
difficulties”[
10] caused by the First Assumption: 
A) insufficient persistence of the equilibrium’s data relative to the endowments 
of capital goods;  
B) insufficient factor substitutability;  
C) dilemma (due to the need to take into account the changes that equilibrium 
prices will undergo over time) between on the one hand the intertemporal-equilibrium 
road, with its totally unrealistic assumptions of either complete futures markets or 
perfect foresight; and on the other hand the temporary-equilibrium road, with the 
indefiniteness (plus a Pandora box of other problems) that arises owing to 
unobservable subjective non-uniform expectations.  
But the adjective “methodological”, although not easily replaced (I too will use 
it below), is a potentially misleading one, and it may have contributed to the little 
attention given so far to these problems by the great majority of mainstream 
economists. Methodological discussions are dismissed by many scientists as the futile 
attempt by philosophers to tell scientists how to do science. Quite to the contrary, the 
deficiencies of neo-Walrasian general equilibrium theory highlighted by these 
criticisms are no less analytical, and no less grave, than for example the inconsistency 
of a given value endowment of capital in J. B. Clark or Wicksell.  
                                              
10 These difficulties (without the adjective ‘methodological’) are remembered in a paper 
by Garegnani (2005a: 422-23, 430-31) which is a direct reply to Mandler (2002), but they 
have been left unheeded by Mandler in his rejoinder (2005), except for a striking admission 
on perfect foresight which is commented upon in fn. 21?? below.                      
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Indeed, to assume that the endowments of capital goods do not change during 
the adjustments toward equilibrium is no less absurd than to assume that, when 
distribution changes, the value of capital does not change. Fairy-tale institutions as 
unreal as the auctioneer might well be imagined, capable of maintaining the value of 
capital unchanged in the face of changes of real wages, for example by imposing by 
fiat such productions and savings as will quickly re-establish the previous value of 
the capital endowment after a change in prices; the behaviour of such an institution 
would have no correspondence with the behaviour of a market economy, but the same 
is true of the auctioneer. The result is, analogously to when one takes as given the 
value of capital, that when assuming a given vector of endowments of capital goods 
one takes something as given in the equilibrium equations, which in fact cannot be 
treated as given because it is relevantly altered by any realistic process of 
adjustment[
11]; thus the  assumption that adjustment operates through an auctioneer-
guided tâtonnement hides an indeterminacy of the system of equilibrium equations, 
analogous to the one Friedrich Lutz (1967, p. 69) admitted for long-period equilibria 
when he wrote  
 
the subsistence fund, in the sense of a given value magnitude, cannot be taken as 
a datum but is itself one of the unknowns, so that the system of these writers [he 
was referring to Böhm-Bawerk, Wicksell, and other ‘Austrian’ authors, F.P.] lacked 
one equation for determining the equilibrium. 
 
Allow me to insist on the analytical nature – that risks being obscured by the 
adjective ‘methodological’ – of this difficulty. After any change or novelty, firms 
must find out anew the demand for their products at the several product prices; and 
the only way is by trial and error, with unwanted accumulations or decumulations of 
inventories in the meanwhile; adapting production to demand and bringing 
inventories back to normal takes time, and during this time production goes on and 
alters the amounts in existence of the several capital goods; hence it is contradictory 
to assume a gravitation of produced quantities toward an equality between supply and 
demand, and not to assume that this process alters the amounts in existence of capital 
goods, and alters them in a way different from the one that would be brought about 
by the instantaneous reaching, at the inital moment, of an intertemporal 
equilibrium[
12].  
                                              
11 The inconsistency of a given value of capital too can be expressed in terms of 
insufficient persistence, because the value of capital goods is altered by the changes in prices 
and in quantities going on during disequilibrium adjustments.  
12 Thus consider an economy at date zero. Assume uniqueness of equilibrium in order to 
see the problem more clearly. The intertemporal equilibrium from date zero onwards is what 
the theory allows us to determine on the basis of the date-0 data (if we grant complete 
futures markets, of course). If adjustments are not instantaneous, when this economy reaches 
date 1 its endowments of capital goods are neither the ones of date zero, nor the ones it 
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3. That the adjustment of produced quantities to demand necessarily requires 
actual trial-and-error productions is highlighted by the absurd role one is obliged to 
assign to the auctioneer the moment Constant Returns to Scale for industries (i.e. 
CRS for individual firms and/or free entry[
13]) are admitted. In the auctioneer-guided 
tâtonnement the size and/or number of price-taking firms in an industry becomes 
infinite the moment positive extraprofits[
14] can be made; therefore the auctioneer can 
only call zero-extraprofit prices, but at these prices the size and/or number of firms in 
each industry is indeterminate, so, unless the auctioneer becomes a true planner who 
ensures equality between supply and demand by imposing how many firms (and 
which ones of the potential ones) will be active and also (if there are firm-level CRS) 
how much each of them shall produce, equilibrium cannot be reached: outputs at 
equilibrium prices are indeterminate[
15]. If on the contrary production is required to 
                                                                                                                                             
would have had at date 1 if at date 0 it had instantaneously reached the intertemporal 
equilibrium corresponding to the date-0 data. For the same reason, the intertemporal 
equilibrium that might be established at date 1 on the basis of the new date-1 data will not be 
reached either, so the danger arises of a cumulation of deviations from the original 
equilibrium path, deviations that can be of any magnitude in the absence of a theory of 
quantities and employment in disequilibrium. The implications of this fact have been 
described by Franklin M. Fisher (1983) as follows: “In a real economy, however, trading, as 
well as production and consumption, goes on out of equilibrium. It follows that, in the course 
of convergence to equilibrium (assuming that occurs), endowments change. In turn this 
changes the set of equilibria. Put more succinctly, the set of equilibria is path dependent ... 
[This path dependence] makes the calculation of equilibria corresponding to the initial state 
of the system essentially irrelevant. What matters is the equilibrium that the economy will 
reach from given initial endowments, not the equilibrium that it would have been in, given 
initial endowments, had prices happened to be just right” (Fisher, 1983, p. 14). Since Fisher 
explictly mentions production, he is not referring only to reallocations of given total 
endowments among consumers but also to changes in the endowments themselves. And the 
problem is worse than one might infer from this quotation: since general equilibrium theory 
is silent on what happens in non-virtual disequilibrium, “the equilibrium that the economy 
will reach from given initial endowments” cannot be determined; one cannot even establish 
whether an equilibrium will be reached at all; the theory tells us nothing at all as to how the 
economy will behave.  
13 That many general equilibrium theorists may have found it legitimate to assume a given 
number of decreasing-returns-to-scale firms, even in intertemporal equilibrium models 
(where the assumption means forbidding the birth of new firms even over time horizons of 
decades! white-hot nonsense), is truly a scandal, indicative of a disastrous readiness to 
accept mathematically convenient assumptions without worrying about their economic 
soundness. 
14 To circumvent the difference in the definition of profits in the classical and in the 
neoclassical tradition, I use ‘extraprofits’ to mean profits in the neoclassical sense (i.e. net of 
interest charges and risk allowance: but risk is neglected in the present paper). 
15 This shows the illegitimacy of the ‘factor tâtonnement’ as a representation, however 
idealized, of the working of markets in economies with production, and is therefore a 
criticism of the Third Assumption. Note that the same need for the auctioneer to act as a 
planner if outputs are to adjust to demands arises for Schefold’s ‘uninformed auctioneer’ too, 
                                                                                                                       %                    
 9 
be actual, as in real economies, then the instantaneous explosion of industry capacity 
to infinite size cannot happen because firms must get hold of factors in order to 
produce and therefore their supply is limited by the availability of plants and other 
specialized factors whose supply takes time to be altered; which is why traditionally 
the indeterminateness of long-period supply at cost-covering prices was not 
considered a problem. The point is that if production must be actual then, as Marshall 
pointed out, supply can be assumed to be along a short-period industry curve 
conditioned by the availability of plants and other specialized factors; on the contrary 
in the tâtonnement firms promise to produce on the basis of their demands for factors 
(including fixed plants[
16]), which need not be equal to the availability of those 
factors, so factor availability is no constraint on firms’ supply decisions, which are 
accordingly infinite if there are extraprofits to be made, and are indeterminate if 
extraprofits are zero. Thus, unless one assumes a planned economy, actual 
productions are indispensable for individual decisions to bring about an adjustment of 
productions to demands; but the adjustment takes time and alters the amounts in 
existence of the several capital goods.  
Thus the idea of product markets reaching equality between supply and 
demand not because of a planner’s intervention but because of individual decisions 
requires actual trial-and-error productions, and as a result the system of general 
equilibrium equations becomes underdetermined because the data relative to the 
endowments of the several capital goods cannot be treated as data, they must be 
treated as variables. The equations no longer suffice to determine an equilibrium. The 
theory is revealed to be as incapable of determining an equilibrium, as the long-
period versions without a given value endowment of capital.  
 
4.  I turn to the substitutability problem. That there will be too little 
substitutability among factors if the ‘form’ of capital is given was implicit in the 
writings of many traditional marginalist economists, and was explicitly admitted by 
Hicks in his 1932 Theory of Wages with reference to the demand for labour, in a 
passage quoted or cited so many times by Garegnani and by myself that there is no 
need to quote it again now. But allow me to quote, with a few minor corrections, my 
1991 comment on that passage (Review of Political Economy 1991, p. 272): 
 
The important implication of this line of argument is that short-period 
neoclassical analyses cannot aim at endogenously determining the real wage as an 
                                                                                                                                             
at least in the description supplied in (Schefold 2005a p. 467): without his intervention, first-
period intended outputs will not be c0*+q1*Aα.  
16 A firm can demand plants too; in spite of the very-short-period nature of modern 
general equilibria, there is no justification for assuming that firms can only use the fixed 
plants they are initially endowed with. They can try to buy fixed plants of other firms; 
therefore it would be as arbitrary to exclude markets for fixed plants from the tâtonnement, 
as to exclude markets for lands.                    
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equilibrium real wage. In order to avoid implausible results, the real wage in the 
short period must be admitted to be essentially sticky; perhaps slowly moving up or 
down according to the sign of the excess demand for labour, but anyway starting 
from a level that the analysis must take as exogenously given. Only long-period 
neoclassical analysis can plausibly try to explain the average level of the real wage 
in terms of an equilibrium between supply and demand, where the demand for 
labour is derived from the schedule of the long-period marginal product of labour, a 
notion based on the conception of capital as a single factor capable of changing 
‘form’. Short-period analyses cannot do without long-period theory in the 
marginalist approach. 
 
These considerations apply with even greater force to neo-Walrasian, i.e. very-
short-period, equilibria; here again I can rely on Hicks who in 1980-1981, in the 
course of a discussion of the difference between the IS-LM approach and temporary 
equilibrium theory, admitted that within the single ‘week’ of his Value and Capital 
temporary equilibria “The actual outputs of products, and probably also the actual 
input of labour, would be largely predetermined” (1980-81, p. 55). The essentially 
vertical labour demand curve thus admitted by Hicks undermines any attempt at a 
very-short-period equilibrium theory of wages (given the little right to presume with 
sufficient generality a positively sloped and highly elastic labour supply curve). The 
equilibrium wage might easily be zero or anyway implausibly low, or so high as to 
reduce other factor rentals to zero or nearly so; and small changes in labour 
endowment might bring about enormous changes in income distribution, cf. Fig. 1(b). 
The contradiction of such theoretical predictions with observation would deprive the 
theory of plausibility.  
The neoclassical need for a highly elastic labour demand curve, and therefore 
for a long-period determination of the labour demand curve, is reinforced by the need 
to avoid multiple equilibria or the possibility of what can be called nearly or 
practically indeterminate equilibria, in the presence of a ‘backward-bending’ labour 
supply curve. The second of these possibilities is almost never mentioned so it 
deserves  a graphical illustration, cf. Fig. 1(a). The labour demand curve must be 
sufficiently elastic as to render it highly improbable not only that it may cross more 
than once the backward-bending supply curve but also that, when the two curves 
cross only once and hence the equilibrium on the labour market is unique, excess 
demand may remain extremely close to zero in a wide interval around the equilibrium 
wage, as in Fig. 1(a) where the equilibrium wage is w2 but excess demand is 
extremely close to zero between w1 and w3. If the latter case were to occur, since the 
tendency of the wage to change cannot but be the weaker the closer supply and 
demand are to equality, the supply-and-demand forces tending to alter a 
disequilibrium wage in the interval (w1,w3) would be extremely weak and thus, to all 
practical effects, a supply-and-demand theory of wages would have to admit an 
indeterminacy of wages in a wide interval. 
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5. It may be useful – although perhaps a digression – to stress some further 
implications of treating the quantities of the several capital goods as variables, so as 
to show what vistas tend to be excluded from the economist’s vision when the need 
for such a treatment of capital goods is neglected. 
When one asks what determines the quantities of capital goods, their tendency 
to adapt to the demand for them at supply prices is the obvious answer. But this 
adaptation assumes a variability of the quantities produced of them, whose 
implications are not always fully grasped. The variability of the quantities produced 
of capital goods is part and parcel of that considerable capacity of production quickly 
to adjust to demand, that characterizes most markets of produced goods and without 
which our society would be very different. Without a quick adaptability of the flow 
supply of capital goods to demand, the adaptability of supply to demand would be 
non-existent for most produced goods: a flexible supply of flour is indispensable for 
the supply of bread to adapt to demand without frequent and large changes in the 
price of bread, changes that would enrage consumers and shake the smooth 
functioning of society. Competition contributes: firms want to be able to guarantee a 
quick adaptation of production to demand, in order to maintain customer goodwill 
and not to lose market shares. Thus they maintain some ‘slack’ in the normal 
utilization of their available quickly mobilizable resources: spare capacity, 
inventories, some unused potential supply of labour services. Part of this ‘slack’ is 
also ensured by cost minimization: the need to pay higher wages for night shifts 
induces firms not to use fixed plants 24 hours a day; but increases in the utilization of 
fixed plant remain possible if demand increases. Inventories (usually neglected in 
general equilibrium theory) of raw materials and of parts to be assembled ensure the 
possibility of rapid increases of production; the consequent run down inventories are 
rapidly reconstituted by the increased production of the industries producing them. 
Capitalist economies add to this flexibility by maintaining a considerable amount of 
unemployment; but even employed labour can generally supply an increased amount 
of labour services if asked to do so. Without this ‘slack’, the absence of short-period                    
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factor substitutability would make it very difficult to vary production by simply 
transferring some variable factors, e.g. labour, from one industry or firm to another; 
the observed generally quick adaptation of supplies to demands would not be 
possible. (This ‘slack’ was implicitly conceded as a positive element of capitalist 
economies in the Western literature that criticized the ‘tautness’ of planning in the 
USSR.) The flexibility of production must be expected to be even greater than 
average in the durable capital goods industries, where firms know that they must 
stand ready to face strong swings in demand (for the well-known reasons that gave 
birth to the term ‘accelerator’).  
This generalized ‘slack’ strongly suggests a view of economic growth and 
capital accumulation as dependent on the evolution of aggregate demand[
17], because 
it implies that aggregate production too can quickly adjust not only to decreases of 
aggregate demand, but also – within limits rarely approached – to increases in 
aggregate demand, so that it is generally possible, even in economies very close to 
full employment, to raise at the same time consumption and investment, if aggregate 
demand increases[
18]. Hence investment is almost never constrained by savings; 
capital accumulation will result from the demand for additions to capital stocks due to 
increases in desired capacity, in turn due to increases of aggregate demand.  
What seems to emerge here is that a paradigm, or vision, or theory, is also a 
mental straitjacket. It can act as blinkers, it can make it more difficult to perceive, or 
to admit the importance of, certain aspects of reality because it has difficulty in fitting 
them into its theoretical framework. The dominance of the neoclassical paradigm, 
with its tendency to an equilibrium based on given and fully utilized factor supplies, 
has obscured the flexibility of aggregate production in response to changes in 
aggregate demand, with its radically anti-neoclassical implications for growth theory.  
The implications of this ‘slack’ can also be discussed for wages and the 
demand for labour, and again they radically undermine the neoclassical ‘vision’ of 
the basic forces at work in a capitalist economy. The flexibility of production in 
response to changes in demand implies that there is no necessary influence, in the 
short as well as in the long period, of changes in real wages on the demand for labour. 
For example, let us suppose that the government wants to raise both the level of real 
wages, and employment. An increase in aggregate demand will be generally capable 
of attaining both objectives: the adaptability of production to demand in the capital 
goods industries means that there will be little problem with adopting in new 
                                              
17 Cf. e.g. Garegnani and Palumbo, 1988; or Petri, 2003; and the vast literature only 
partially there mentioned. 
18 Most plants can usually produce much more than ‘normal’ production, by having 
recourse to multiple-shift production or full-pace production 24 hours a day. Labour 
constraints are usually non-existent in the short run because of visible or hidden 
unemployment and underemployment, and over the longer run there are migrations and 
structural social adaptations, e.g. changes in the participation of women, that suggest that in 
the longer run labour supply, like capacity, adapts to demand.                      
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plants[
19] the new optimal technical choices associated with the higher real wage, 
while at the same time increasing the overall level of production and employment. 
This will be so even when it were the case that a higher wage implied a shift to more 
capital-intensive techniques and therefore required more savings per unit of labour in 
new plants (the traditional neoclassical thesis whose general validity has been 
undermined by reverse capital deepening): the increase in savings will be brought 
about by the increase in production[
20]. 
 
6. I come to complete futures markets. Their need arises from the illegitimacy, 
in this framework, of the assumption that changes in equilibrium relative prices are so 
slow as to be negligible, the assumption made possible for neoclassical long-period 
theorists by their treating the capital endowment as a single quantity of variable 
‘form’ and its composition as adapted rather than given, and therefore not needing 
quick changes (as on the contrary is generally the case with arbitrary given initial 
proportions among capital goods). Since agents know that relative prices are going to 
change, their decisions in the initial period cannot be assumed to be based on 
stationary price expectations, and the theory must determine the future prices on 
which they base their current decisions. Then the alternatives are either subjective 
expectations as in temporary equilibria (discussed later) or the simultaneous 
determination of objective current and future prices through complete futures 
markets.  
Now, complete futures markets do not exist and cannot possibly exist. People 
not yet born cannot be present to-day to indicate how much labour they will intend to 
supply and whether they will want apples or pears. Contracts foreseeing all possible 
contingencies in the future are inconceivable. It is indeed amazing that such an absurd 
assumption should have gained general acceptance among general equilibrium 
specialists, to the point of being even extended to assuming complete markets for the 
infinite future (an incredible development to be interpreted mainly as an admission 
that the assumption of a finitely far date where the economy will end was 
unacceptable, coupled with an inability or unwillingness to question the root of the 
trouble – the First Assumption).  
                                              
19 It is only in new plants that optimal technical choices can be adopted. Already existing 
plants earn quasi-rents, and there is little reason to assume that – as long as they are not shut 
down earlier than otherwise – normal labour utilization in them will be relevantly affected by 
a higher real wage, given the little room for changes in production methods. Thus, employed 
labour will be combined with capital goods adapted to new optimal technical choices only 
gradually, as existing plants gradually reach the end of their economic life and are replaced 
by new plants. 
20 In looking for possible dangers created by wage rises for labour employment, one will 
then consider much more relevant the political considerations stressed in Kalecki’s “Political 
Aspects of Full Employment” or, more recently, in Armstrong, Glyn and Harrison’s 
Capitalism since 1945.                    
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Interestingly, there are some indications that when put with their backs against 
the wall on the plausibility of such an assumption, general equilibrium theorists 
appear to prefer the interpretation of the intertemporal model as assuming, not 
complete futures markets, but a sequence of one-period equilibria plus perfect 
foresight[
21]; however, even leaving aside the plausibility of the perfect foresight 
assumption[
22], it is known that there are excellent reasons to doubt the possibility of 
a  logically satisfactory  definition of perfect foresight. For example, if the 
intertemporal equilibrium is not unique[
23], what can perfect foresight mean? And 
what about perfect foresight of future advances of knowledge, which are by definition 
unpredictable?  
Also, the previous discussion of the need for a planner-auctioneer owing to 
indeterminacy of outputs under free entry/CRS implies that, absent such a planner-
auctioneer, even if (i) the intertemporal equilibrium is unique, (ii) correct equilibrium 
prices for the initial period are announced and future equilibrium prices and quantities 
are correctly derived by agents, and (iii) everybody acts as price taker relative to these 
prices, still equilibrium quantities will not be produced except by a totally improbable 
fluke; thus correct knowledge of future equilibrium prices and equilibrium quantities 
does not ensure that equilibrium will be realized; then of what can there be perfect 
foresight?     
A less widely noticed problem with perfect foresight is the following: how is 
one to reconcile the perfect foresight assumption with the admission, implicit in the 
recourse to the tâtonnement for the study of stability, that the equilibrium must be 
found? The need for a tâtonnement implies that equilibrium prices are not known, so 
                                              
21 Thus Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green in their well-known 1995 textbook admit that 
the Arrow-Debreu model (i.e. the intertemporal model with complete futures markets) “is 
hardly realistic” and for this reason take care to “show that Arrow-Debreu equilibria can be 
reinterpreted by means of trading processes that actually unfold through time”, of course 
under an assumption that “the spot equilibrium prices [of subsequent periods] are correctly 
anticipated at t=0”, an assumption whose realism unfortunately they forget to discuss (Mas-
Colell et al., 1995, pp. 694-95). And Arrow has said: “The trouble is that with heterogeneous 
capital goods almost anything is possible. Now, I do not think this in any way interferes with 
the consistency of the general equilibrium theory of capital formation based on perfect 
foresight. You may not like the assumption of perfect foresight; that I can understand. But 
what I am saying is that there is no logical inconsistency in the perfect foresight model” 
(Arrow, 1989, p. 155). Mandler too appears to interpret intertemporal equilibrium models as 
based on perfect foresight, when he writes that  “Perfect foresight models are not designed to 
deliver descriptive accuracy” (2005: 487). This is an interesting admission; the question then 
inevitably arises, which neoclassical general equilibrium models are designed to deliver 
“descriptive accuracy”? None, it would seem. 
22 The amount of information and the computing abilities that agents must be assumed to 
have (outside a situation where nothing is changing) is mind-boggling.  
23 Or if the intertemporal equilibrium would be unique if based on complete futures 
markets but in the corresponding sequential equilibrium there arises Mandler’s 
indeterminacy.                    
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perfect foresight cannot be interpreted to mean correct foreknowledge of future 
equilibrium prices before the tâtonnement starts (it would be absurd to assume such a 
foreknowledge but not the knowledge of the equilibrium prices for current markets); 
on the other hand, the perfect foresight assumption is made in order to try and 
surmount the absence of complete futures markets; so, it would seem, one must 
assume that the tâtonnement operates only in the current-period markets, and perfect 
foresight must be interpreted to mean that all agents agree on what the prices called 
on current markets at a stage of the tâtonnement imply for future prices: all agents 
would have to have the same function determining (and determining correctly!) the 
vector of expected future prices as a function of the prices called for current markets 
at each stage of the tâtonnement; but at present no theory exists of what such a 
function might mean; and it is difficult to imagine a non-arbitrary theory. What seems 
clear is that present tâtonnement theory[
24] would be inapplicable: this reveals the 
absence of any stability theory for the intertemporal general equilibrium model if 
complete futures markets are missing – and they are.  
 
7. The absurdity of the complete futures markets assumption and of the 
hypothesis that the equilibrium is reached by an instantaneous tâtonnement has been 
stressed in a number of recent articles – no less than seven – by Mark Blaug (1997, 
1999, 1999b, 2002, 2002b, 2003, 2003b). These articles are interesting, first of all, 
because they make it difficult to go on writing, as Mandler does, “While a couple of 
assertions in Solow growth theory about steady states hinge on whether the economy 
has a single sector and whether capital aggregates, the operation of competitive 
markets does not.” (2008 p. 804, italics added). In these lines Mandler, abandoning 
earlier cautions, unproblematically identifies “the operation of competitive markets” 
with how this operation is described in intertemporal general equilibrium theory. 
Against such an identification, Blaug accuses modern GE theory of preventing  
 
consideration of all dimensions of competitive rivalry other than price, such as 
availability, quality of product, quality of delivery, quantity and quality of 
information about the product, etc.; in short, all aspects of non-price competition 
because those take place sequentially in real time. This is precisely what 
competition meant to Smith, Ricardo and Marx and, even after Cournot, this is what 
it meant to Marshall (Blaug 1999b: 266, emphasis added).  
 
Blaug’s articles are one more proof of the existence of a widespread unease 
with modern general equilibrium theory in the profession. But they are also 
interesting because of their deficiencies. Blaug insists on the need to admit elements 
of non-price competitive behaviour that “take place sequentially in real time”, and 
                                              
24 By this I mean the usual tâtonnement for intertemporal exchange economies, and the 
‘factor tâtonnement’ for economies with production.                      
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declares that their being inevitably associated with sequences of decisions in real time 
is precisely the reason why they find no place in modern competitive price theory; but 
doesn’t price competition (with the entailed adjustments in quantities) take time too? 
So, the root of the deficiencies of modern competitive price theory that Blaug 
denounces is the inability of modern general equilibrium theory to admit time-
consuming adjustments, which is what obliges the theorist to assume a totally unreal 
working of competition and of adjustments, and to determine a very-short-period 
equilibrium where the lack of persistence of relative prices cannot be neglected 
(whence the assumption of complete futures markets). But then, shouldn’t one look 
for the reasons why modern GE theory suffers from this deficiency, differently from 
the analyses of earlier authors? However, Blaug is unable to trace the real root of the 
‘sickness’ of which he accuses modern economic theory and in particular the Arrow-
Debreu model[
25]. He appears unable to see that both the main shortcomings he finds 
in the Arrow-Debreu model, the fairy-tale tâtonnement and the complete futures 
markets, were due to the replacement (in neoclassical equilibrium theory) of the 
traditional specification of the capital endowment as a single quantity of 
endogenously determined ‘form’ with a given vector of endowments of capital goods. 
This blindness makes it possible for Blaug to advocate a return to Marshall, without 
realizing that we cannot go back to notions of ‘centres of gravitation’ of market prices 
and quantities while retaining the marginalist/neoclassical approach to distribution. It 
was precisely the decision not to abandon that approach in the face of its inability to 
determine long-period[
26] ‘centres of gravitation’, that prompted the shift to very-
                                              
25 “...modern economics is sick; economics has increasingly become an intellectual game 
played for its own sake and not for its practical consequences; economists have gradually 
converted the subject into a sort of Social Mathematics in which analytical rigor as 
understood in math departments is everything and empirical relevance (as understood in 
physics departments) is nothing…To paraphrase the title of a popular British musical: ‘No 
Reality, Please. We’re Economists’ ” (Blaug 2002: 36).  “The Formalist Revolution made 
the existence and determinacy of equilibrium the be all and end all of economic 
analysis...What is little understood about the Formalist Revolution of the 1950’s is precisely 
that the process-conception of equilibrium was so effectively buried in that period that what 
is now called neoclassical orthodoxy, mainstream economics, consists entirely of static end-
state equilibrium theorizing with little attention to the stability of equilibrium” (Blaug 2003: 
146).  “If we can date the onset of the illness at all, it is the publication in 1954 of a famous 
paper by ... Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu; it is this paper that marks the beginning of 
what has since become a cancerous growth in the very center of microeconomics.” (Blaug 
2002: 36). For a more detailed commentary on these articles by Blaug cf. Petri (2006). 
26 Which does not mean steady-state. Nowadays it seems to be often forgotten that the 
potential speed of change in the composition of capital is of a higher order of magnitude than 
the speed of capital accumulation or of changes in population, which is the reason why both 
classical and traditional neoclassical economists esteemed – and rightly so, it would seem – 
that it is generally legitimate to neglect the slow effects of accumulation on income 
distribution when one studies the determinants of normal relative product prices. Therefore 
Marshall, for example, carefully distinguished long-period analysis, where capital 
composition was assumed to have adjusted but the total capital endowment was given, from 
                                                                                                                       %                    
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short-period, neo-Walrasian, general equilibrium theory. The root of the problem is 
the supply-and-demand approach to distribution itself, which comes out to be unable 
satisfactorily to treat capital in all its versions.  
 
8. Temporary equilibria (without perfect foresight) have not been considered 
in the debate on which I am focusing. Actually, nowadays there is no reference to 
temporary general equilibria in advanced neoclassical textbooks on value theory, 
which suggests a general pessimism on the possibility to obtain useful results in that 
direction[
27]. However, the moment one admits that complete futures markets do not 
exist and cannot exist and that perfect foresight makes no sense, some kind of 
temporary-equilibrium analysis appears to be the only avenue left for a supply-and-
demand approach to prices and quantities. Unfortunately for this approach, the 
‘methodological’ criticisms still apply; only, the absurdity of complete futures 
markets is replaced by the given subjective expectations or expectation functions, 
which not only constitute a second group of data deprived of persistence, but are also 
unknowable and accordingly render the theory’s results indefinite because depending 
on essentially arbitrary assumptions on expectations and on their evolution. Here I 
only wish to render this criticism concrete by remembering Garegnani’s argument, in 
his 1978 “Notes on Consumption etc.”, that a short-period approach to investment 
such as one can find in Marshall, if truly severed from reference to the long-period 
substitution mechanisms based on capital the homogeneous factor, would be unable 
to reach definite conclusions, because too many indeterminate influences would be 
present: disproportions between capacity and demand in each industry; age structure 
of equipment and effects of changes of the interest rate on scrapping; and above all, 
the state of expectations:  
 
The attempt to determine the effects on investment of changes in the rate of 
interest on such indefinite grounds wold seem liable to dissolve into casuistry 
concerning the influence of these changes on the expectations of entrepreneurs. And 
this influence would differ from situation to situation, thus making impossible any 
general and unambiguous conclusions concerning direction and intensity of the 
effects of interest on investment. (Garegnani 1978, p. 347).  
 
                                                                                                                                             
very-long-period (or secular) equilibria where the amount of capital was endogenously 
determined at the level inducing zero net savings, and he based his theory of normal prices 
on the former, where the slow changes of long-period prices over time were neglected. Cf. 
Petri (2004, pp. 36-38, 72-73, 119). 
27 There has been a series of negative results on the possibility to prove the existence of a 
temporary equilibrium under sufficiently general assumptions. But no doubt the arbitrariness 
of the assumptions necessary to render the system of equations definite (e.g. assumptions on 
how firms take decisions when the share owners have different expectations) has also 
contributed to the disillusionment with temporary equilibrium theory.                    
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As an example of this indeterminacy of conclusions, consider the possibility 
that a decrease of the rate of interest induces a generalized expectation that the rate of 
interest will keep decreasing, and causes therefore a postponement of investment 
decisions i.e. a decrease of investment in the short period.  
The implication is that only a theory of investment that aims at determining 
average behaviour over sufficiently long periods, giving time to expectations to be 
revised in the light of experience, can hope to reach unambiguous, sufficiently 
general conclusions[
28]. Once the traditional conception of capital-labour substitution 
is abandoned, neoclassical theory is unable to supply such a theory[
29]. 
 
9. Summing up: only persistent forces, persistently acting through the trial-
and-error choices implemented by agents and pushing toward well-defined states, can 
allow reaching definite conclusions on the tendencies of market economies and can 
therefore be the basis of a theory of value, distribution, employment and growth. 
Modern general equilibrium theory does not satisfy this requirement. It is able 
to give indications only on the behaviour of fairy-tale economies continuously in 
equilibrium. The moment one admits that, since adjustments take time, some of the 
data of the equilibrium equations (the ones relative to the endowments of capital 
goods) cannot be taken as data, the theory becomes unable to determine the behaviour 
of the economy.  
This radically questions the relevance of any stability result obtained for 
modern general equilibrium theory. Results on the behaviour of tâtonnement-type 
adjustments have no implications for the behaviour of real economies. That the 
tâtonnement is stable does not prove that a real economy would be stable. 
Conversely, the non-convergence of the tâtonnement does not prove that more 
realistic adjustments will not converge.  
Support for this last statement is provided by Professor Gintis’s commendable 
                                              
28 Keynes states this very clearly in a letter to Kalecki, dated 12 April 1937: “I hope you 
are not right in thinking that my General Theory depends on an assumption that the 
immediate reaction of a capitalist is of a particular kind. I tried to deal with this on page 271 
[? probably 261, F.P.], where I assume that the immediate reaction of capitalists is the most 
unfavourable to my conclusion. I regard behaviour as arrived at by trial and error, and no 
theory can be regarded as sound which depends on the initial reaction being of a particular 
kind. One must assume that the initial reaction may be anything in the world, but that the 
process of trial and error will eventually arrive at the conclusion which one is predicting” 
(Keynes 1973-79, vol. XII, p. 797). 
29 Cf. Petri 2004, ch. 7, for a criticism of modern neoclassical theories that attempt to 
prove a negative elasticity of investment vis-à-vis the interest rate without explicitly relying 
on capital-labour substitution. That the ‘Sraffian’ criticism of neoclassical capital theory 
aims at questioning the assumption of full utilization of resources appears to escape Mandler, 
who never discusses the possibility of a theory of long-period income distribution admitting 
labour unemployment; his discussion of “Sraffian indeterminacy” assumes the full 
employment of labour and implicitly attributes such an assumption to Sraffa.                    
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attempt (Gintis 2007) to replace the tâtonnement with something more acceptable, 
and not only for exchange economies but also for production economies. He proposes 
a very realistic picture; adjustments are time-consuming and entail exchanges and 
productions at disequilibrium prices; products in each industry are homogeneous 
across firms but firms can afford to be price-makers because consumers take time to 
find out the several firms’ prices, so firms modify prices according to sales, and 
consumers continuously choose between buying (or supplying labour, if that is the 
decision to be taken) or going on searching for better exchange opportunities; a 
fundamental role is assigned to imitation of the more successful agents. There is also 
entry of new firms and exit (bankruptcy) of unsuccessful firms. Through simulations 
Gintis proves that even in a situation (the one of Scarf’s famous exchange-economy 
example) where the tâtonnement does not converge to (the unique) equilibrium, his 
imitation-based adjustment converges; and in the production economy for a very 
wide range of parameters the economy converges over time to a neighbourhood of 
the neoclassical general equilibrium.  
However, his is an a-capitalistic economy[
30], essentially without aggregate 
demand problems[
31], and with factor endowments unaffected by disequilibrium 
(which is what allows him to consider time-consuming adjustments involving 
disequilibrium transactions and productions); thus, his conclusions that his result 
‘provides some justification for the importance placed upon the Walrasian model in 
contemporary economic theory’ (p. 1303) and that ‘models allowing traders, 
consumers, workers and firms to imitate successful others lead to an economy with a 
                                              
30 Bilancini and Petri (2009), as part of their critical appraisal of Gintis’s conclusions, 
show that the factor that Gintis calls ‘capital’ is in fact land.  
31 Interestingly, the possibility of consumers temporarily hoarding money implies that 
aggregate demand can fall short of aggregate supply in Gintis's model in spite of the absence 
of investment, highlighting the often forgotten fact that the absence of capital goods (and 
hence of investment) does not guarantee the validity of Say's Law. However, Gintis assumes 
that in each period consumers spend all the money they have if only they can find the goods 
they plan to buy and if they are not discouraged by prices that look too high (thus obtaining 
that hoarding is compensated by dishoarding and the propensity to consume is unitary on 
average), and he also assumes that loss-making firms are almost entirely re-financed by the 
monetary authority (and the bankruptcies are roughly compensated by creation of new 
firms); under these assumptions for a wide range of parameters the occurring of a relevant or 
persistent insufficiency of aggregate expenditure relative to the value of aggregate 
production will be highly improbable. Then the tendency toward the full employment of 
labour, permitted by the decreasing demand curve for labour ensured by the treatment of 
‘capital’ as strictly analogous to land and fully employed by assumption (a way to sweep 
under the carpet some little-noticed stability problems of neoclassical equilibrium arising 
when all factors are unemployed and one admits that expenditure can only come from the 
employed factors), encounters no Keynesian aggregate-demand problem. If capital were 
treated as produced, heterogeneous and of variable ‘form’, and therefore of changing 
composition during adjustments, then the decreasing demand curve for labour would lose 
any firm basis; and the presence of investment expenditure in aggregate demand would make 
it necessary to have a theory of investment in order to determine labour employment.                     
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reasonable level of stability and efficiency’ (p. 1304), are illegitimate; the extension 
of his approach to an economy with capital goods would require examining the 
dynamic properties of time-consuming adjustments that change the amounts of 
capital goods; the results could not possibly confirm or disprove the stability of a 
general equilibrium based on a given vector of capital endowments; furthermore, his 
adjustments ensure some flexibility of production, but in a capitalistic economy any 
flexibility of production will introduce room for the phenomena mentioned in 
paragraph 5 above, implying the need for a theory of aggregate demand and for a 
theory of wages in order to surmount the indeterminacy of effects of changes of real 
wages on the demand for labour; thus no conclusion about the implications of 
Gintis’s adjustments for capitalistic economies can be reached before one decides on 
the theory of wages and on the theory of aggregate investment; on these issues the 
inability of general equilibrium theory to indicate the behaviour of real economies 
obliges one to turn to non-neoclassical approaches, and then the field is wide open 
and, for example, multiplier-accelerator instabilities cannot be excluded. What can be 
excluded is traditional neoclassical approaches to investment theory and to the 
demand for labour, because these approaches rely on the conception of capital-labour 
substitution undermined by the Cambridge results[
32]. 
Therefore Gintis’s interesting exercise shows that if, on the one hand, more 
realistic adjustments can surmount some of the negative results on tâtonnement 
stability, on the other hand the moment one tries to conceive of the effects of these 
time-consuming adjustments in economies with capital goods one realizes that 
nothing can be concluded until at least a theory of wages and a theory of investment 
are introduced to render the economy’s behaviour determinate – theories that the 
neoclassical tradition no longer supplies now that the conception of capital as a single 
factor has come out to be indefensible. And non-neoclassical theories of wages and of 
investment are far from bringing to conclusions similar to those of the neoclassical 
approach on the determinants of income distribution, employment and growth.  
 
10.  The thoroughly destructive implications for neoclassical theory of these 
‘methodological’ deficiencies of modern general equilibrium theory appear to be still 
little recognized. Neoclassical theory as applied to the real world, for example 
neoclassical macroeconomic theory, comes out to have no foundation; the pillars of 
its applications, namely the traditional neoclassical beliefs in a decreasing labour 
demand curve and in a decreasing investment function, cannot be defended by 
referring to modern general equilibrium theory, and recourse to their original basis 
(the old marginalist theory based on capital the homogeneous factor) is just as 
                                              
32 Cf. chapters 7 and 8 of Petri (2004). It would be very interesting to study the 
implications of Gintis’s assumptions on adjustments for economies with heterogeneous 
capital and with realistic assumptions on wages and on investment decisions. I am quite sure 
that multiplier-accelerator interactions would indeed develop.                    
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illegitimate; but so far these criticisms have raised no reactions from the (not many) 
neoclassicals who know something about the Cambridge debates on capital theory, 
and as a result a majority of economists, the ones who delegate to the ‘high-brow’ 
gurus of neoclassical value theory the appraisal of these debates, no doubt remain 
ignorant of these criticisms. However, the deficiencies pointed out by these criticisms 
are undeniable; and they are sufficient for a rejection of the supply-and-demand 
approach to value and distribution. 
Therefore the efforts, to show that reswitching and reverse capital deepening 
are damaging for general equilibrium theory in its modern formulations, can be seen 
as attempts at overkill, actually superfluous if the aim is to ascertain whether the 
supply-and-demand approach to value and distribution is defensible. I think that 
perhaps the purpose of these efforts needs more careful explanation than has been 
supplied so far, because they can have the side effect of making the neoclassical side 
somewhat reassured on the relevance of modern general equilibrium theory and on a 
limited relevance of the ‘methodological’ criticisms: why otherwise, the neoclassical 
economist might argue, would the “Sraffians” consider it so important to criticize 
modern general equilibrium theory on its own terrain, accepting complete futures 
markets and instantaneous tâtonnements?  
Why indeed? And why will I too produce an exercise of this type, after stating 
that actually it is superfluous? My reply is as follows. That an argument be 
scientifically correct is not always enough for it to be recognized as such; barriers 
may need surmounting to it being understood or even only heard of. In the present 
case, considerable barriers existed to a correct understanding of what was at stake in 
the Cambridge controversies, owing to the confusions at the time on the development 
of neoclassical theory; there resulted grave misunderstandings that still persist; the 
confusions were compounded by insufficient clarity or erroneousness of the 
arguments of some of the critics too, especially Joan Robinson (Petri, 2004, pp. 227-
38). The persisting misunderstandings help the resistance to appreciate or even only 
confront the ‘methodological’ criticisms: for example it is understandable that there 
be a reluctance to abandon the First Assumption and, with it, a short-period approach 
to value and distribution if – owing to an inability to distinguish long-period analysis 
from steady-state theory – the only alternative is thought to be a steady-state theory 
necessarily far removed from actual conditions. To this one must add the usual 
difficulty with escaping long-absorbed ways of thinking (a difficulty compounded at 
present by the frequent absence of any introduction to non-neoclassical approaches in 
university economics courses), and the understandable resistance of scientists to 
entertain the possibility that their lifelong efforts may have been wasted on a wrong 
approach. For all these reasons, repetition of the ‘methodological’ criticisms appears 
to have limited effects: as the old adage goes, “None so deaf as those who will not 
hear”. Considerable time and effort would be required anyway of economists of 
mainstream formation to surmount the confusions and fully understand the criticisms. 
The hope is to give some of them the motivation to make the effort, by producing 
results that accept the First Assumption and nonetheless show that the shift to very-                   
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short-period equilibria does not eliminate the difficulties of the supply-and-demand 
approach with capital. It may be hoped that these results, if it will be possible to 
produce them, will show the need to reconsider the whole issue, and will make 
economists more open to a reflection on the ‘methodological’ criticisms, to the need 
to drop the First Assumption, to a reappraisal of the evolution of economic theory, 
and to the need to explore alternative theories of income distribution, employment 
and growth.  
 
 
PART  II 
 
11. In this second part of the paper I completely leave aside the issue of 
stability. I will be only concerned with the uniqueness or multiplicity of solutions to 
the equilibrium conditions; I concentrate on whether equilibrium can be non-unique 
owing to the presence of capital goods when the assumptions on consumer behaviour 
would guarantee uniqueness in the absence of capital goods.  
One can usefully enter the issue by discussing Garegnani’s claim that his 2000-
2003 model can yield multiple equilibria not attributable to income effects. The 
precise meaning of the italicized words is not pointed out by Garegnani, he has only 
noted in (2005a, pp. 412-13) that his argument is based exclusively on the possible 
shape of the investment schedule and would still hold if in the second period of his 
two-periods model there were only a single consumption good. Mandler (2002, 2005) 
has countered that ‘discrete’ multiple equilibria in Garegnani’s model must be due at 
least in part to ‘badly behaved’ consumer choice and more specifically to consumer 
heterogeneity, because it is a theorem that in that model and in fact in all general 
equilibrium models of that kind (i.e. with a finite number of commodities and hence 
of periods) the equilibrium production vector is unique and equilibrium prices form a 
convex set if consumer excess demands obey the weak axiom of revealed 
preferences, which, apart from very special examples, implies that there is a 
representative consumer with strictly convex indifference curves; the existence of the 
representative consumer does not exclude income effects but it renders them unable 
to cause (discretely) multiple equilibria (some intuition for this claim will be provided 
in §15). Garegnani has denied the applicability of the theorem to his model, arguing 
that “the results to which Mandler refers concern production systems where 
production of capital goods is in effect overlooked, and therefore both demand for 
them from firms (but ultimately from savers) and supply of them from producing 
firms, are also overlooked in each period” (2005a, p. 413).     
Contrary to the case with his immensely important previous contributions, in 
this case I, like Schefold (2008), find it impossible to agree with Garegnani. The 
reason is simple: the equilibrium conditions of his model are formally identical to the                    
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equilibrium conditions of an atemporal acapitalistic economy[
33] where two 
consumption goods are produced by three different types of labour supplied in fixed 
amounts, two of which (corresponding to the goods a and b of date zero of 
Garegnani’s model) yield services which can also be used for direct consumption 
(e.g. domestic labour, massage, etc.), while the third one (corresponding to 
Garegnani’s labour) yields services which are only useful for production. Try writing 
down the equilibrium equations of this economy, and you will see that they are the 
same as Garegnani’s. (Of course the prices determined in this re-interpretation are not 
discounted prices.) Garegnani’s claim is particularly surprising since production of 
capital goods is definitely ‘overlooked’ in his model too: there is no production of 
capital goods in the model. It is then unclear how he can believe that the model can 
produce results, on equilibrium uniqueness, different from those of the atemporal 
reinterpretation for which, it would seem, he would accept the correctness of 
Mandler’s contention.  
It is important to stress at this point that I am only concerned with the 
uniqueness issue. From this point of view, it is furthermore unclear in what sense one 
might say that, in the intertemporal general equilibrium models where there is 
production of capital goods, supply and demand for produced capital goods are 
overlooked: the equilibrium equations do specify that there must be equilibrium 
between supply and demand for each capital good. True, the explicit indication of 
these conditions might be omitted together with the explicit consideration of 
                                              
33 In an acapitalistic economy there is no production of goods which are then used to 
produce other goods; if there is production the sole factors of production are non-produced, 
i.e. types of labour and types of land. By an atemporal economy I mean an economy where 
variables do not need dating, i.e. an economy whose factor endowments consist only of non-
produced factors, whose final product consists only of consumption goods, and where there 
is no saving and lending and, if significant time intervals exist between application of inputs 
and production of outputs, the interest rate is zero. An acapitalistic economy need not be 
atemporal, as shown by intertemporal pure-exchange equilibria. Traditional marginalist 
analyses of the production-and-exchange economy without capital determined equilibria that 
were atemporal and acapitalistic, with rentals of factor services (labours and lands) and 
prices of consumption goods being the only prices determined by the equilibrium; however, 
atemporal equilibria need not be acapitalistic, they can include produced means of 
production although only through ‘Austrian’ production processes where intermediate goods 
are intermediate stages of the production process of a consumption good, with the process 
started by non-produced factors alone (in Sraffian terminology there is no basic commodity); 
then pricing the intermediate goods may be possible but is irrelevant to determining the cost 
of production of the final consumption good which is simply the sum of the payments to the 
non-produced factors. An atemporal equilibrium of this type can always be rendered 
acapitalistic, at least in the absence of joint production, by omitting the intermediate goods 
by treating production as if all production of consumption goods were vertically integrated 
(cf. § 12); which was the implicit assumption in the traditional treatment of the production-
and-exchange equilibria, since all non-instantaneous production processes of consumption 
goods can be decomposed into successive stages which (except for the last one) produce 
intermediate goods to be then utilized in the next stage.                      
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‘intermediate’ capital goods, via the treatment of the production of ‘final’ goods as 
performed by non-produced factors only (that include the initial endowments of 
capital goods) according to intertemporal production functions of hypothetical 
vertically integrated firms (see below). In such a case the equilibrium on the markets 
of ‘intermediate’ capital goods is taken for granted, as resulting from the cost 
minimization of the hypothetical vertically integrated firms, and one may well 
question this assumption of equilibrium on the markets for ‘intermediate’ capital 
goods which excludes by assumption the possibility of disequilibrium on the savings-
investment markets of intermediate periods[
34]; but this would seem to have a 
potential relevance only for the issue of stability (questioning the ‘factor 
tâtonnement’, which entails precisely such a treatment of production of intermediate 
goods). On uniqueness, as long as the intertemporal equilibrium makes the Second 
Assumption I do not see reasons to deny the reinterpretability of the intertemporal 
equilibrium conditions as describing an atemporal economy, and therefore the 
theorems on uniqueness of standard general equilibrium theory do apply. Relative to 
general atemporal equilibria an intertemporal equilibrium includes some additional 
constraints on technology[
35], but this only means that not all atemporal economies 
can be reinterpreted as intertemporal economies, the converse is always possible; and 
                                              
34 Garegnani (2000, 2003) argues that there is a savings-investment market in the initial 
period too: in his model he calls savings the value of the supply to firms of the not-consumed 
portion of the endowments of commodities a and b of period zero, and he calls investment 
the value of the demand for them by firms in order to produce the consumption goods of 
period 1. Then even with a ‘factor tâtonnement’ there can be disequilibrium on a savings-
investment market, the one of the initial period. However, it must be noted that in (2000, pp. 
436-38) as well as in (2005b, p. 495) in order to discuss the stability implications of his 
analysis Garegnani prefers to consider the savings and investment of period zero as coming 
out, not of stocks (he defines such a treatment ‘misleading’), but of production, by rendering 
period zero an intermediate period through the introduction of a period t = –1. (Why 
misleading, Garegnani does not explain, but one can note that if capital goods are not 
directly consumable – the general case –, the supply to firms of the given initial endowments 
of capital goods does not indicate renouncing period-zero consumption; an alternative 
between consuming and investing in period zero would then require considering the 
possibility of alternative compositions of the period-zero endowment of consumption and 
capital goods, which would require considering production of period -1; furthermore the 
little direct substitutability between factors when capital is of given ‘form’ would obscure 
the possibility of varying production methods as distribution varies, which is at the heart of 
the possibility of anti-neoclassical investment behaviour that Garegnani wants to prove.)      
35 Dates on factors and products must respect the fact that it must be impossible to 
produce a period-t good with period-(t+1) factors; also, at least in the absence of joint 
production the intertemporal production functions must exhibit weak Leontief separability, 
reflecting the fact that earlier inputs are used to produce intermediate goods that then are 
used together with later inputs. The fact that the equilibrium of an atemporal economy can be 
conceived as a long-period equilibrium with a zero interest rate, with all factors being 
indestructible like lands and their services being repeatable, while in intertemporal equilibria 
factor prices are the prices of services of dated factors that last only one period, does not 
seem to prevent the reinterpretability.                    
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these additional constraints on technology do not alter the applicability of the 
theorems on uniqueness of atemporal equilibria, because these theorems are valid for 
very general technologies, of which the intertemporal ones are only special cases. 
Kehoe’s uniqueness theorems based on index theory are perhaps devoid of economic 
content as argued by Fratini (2008), but as far as I know no fault has been found in 
the theorem that states that, if consumer excess demand satisfies the weak axiom (e.g. 
if there is a representative consumer with strictly convex indifference curves), then 
equilibrium is unique in the quantities produced, and the set of equilibrium relative 
prices is convex (so equilibrium is unique in relative prices too if in addition 
consumer excess demand is a one-to-one function of relative prices, e.g. if the 
representative consumer’s indifference curves are differentiable).  
 
12. Some support for my view comes already from the history of economic 
theory: the atemporal (Walras-Cassel) economy of production and exchange, with no 
dating of commodities, just factors and consumption goods, was the one whose 
equilibrium was more rigorously studied by Wald and the starting point of Arrow and 
Debreu; the intertemporal re-interpretation was attached to the same model, with little 
initial reflection on its legitimacy[
36]. This means that when one speaks of the (finite-
horizon) intertemporal Arrow-Debreu model, one is in fact speaking of the atemporal 
model (although satisfying the additional constraints needed for the intertemporal 
reinterpretability), adding to it simply a verbal reinterpretation of the symbols that 
changes nothing in the equilibrium equations[
37]. Own-rates of return are deduced 
                                              
36 The issue needs further study, but it may be noted that there is no mention of the 
intertemporal reinterpretability of the equilibrium equations in terms of dated commodities 
in Wald (1951), who is explicit that his model is essentially Cassel’s and that in it “the 
problem of capital formation and of the rate of interest is not treated at all” (p. 379); and 
Arrow and Debreu (1954) make it clear that Walras’s model of production and exchange 
(not Walras’s model with ‘capitalization’), and Wald, are their starting point. They do 
mention the reinterpretability of their commodities (finite in number) as dated (p. 266), but 
without much reflection, it would seem, on the doubtful implications of such a 
reinterpretation: no mention is made of the need for futures markets or for no savings in the 
final period. As far as I know it is only with the first of Koopmans’s Three Essays on the 
State of Economic Science (1957) that there starts some reflection on the difficulties of the 
intertemporal reinterpretation, cf. Petri (2004, p. 162).   
37 On this issue of perfect equivalence there is an observation by Garegnani that leaves me 
perplexed. He derives from his analysis of what can happen in his 2000-2003 model that a 
difference exists between intertemporal equilibria and atemporal equilibria in that only in 
intertemporal equilibria the possibility arises that a good (b0 in his case), which is a free 
good relative to a future good, may have a positive price relative to a contemporary good, 
and therefore may not be “'free' in the generally accepted sense – when a tendency to zero of 
the price of the commodity in terms of one scarce commodity (b1 in this case) would entail a 
tendency to zero of its price in terms of all other scarce commodities (like a0 here) whether 
of the same, or of another, date.” (2000, p. 418; 2003, p. 146). However, equation (7f) in 
(2000, p. 403) or (5.7f) in (2003, p. 123) has the consequence that if b0 is in excess supply so 
is a0, thus it is unclear how Garegnani can consider a0 scarce. It may be added that atemporal 
                                                                                                                       %                    
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from relative prices re-interpreted as discounted prices, once two goods are re-
interpreted as the same physical good but at two different dates. (I leave aside here 
the further reinterpretability in terms of contingent commodities.) 
The above means that, as long as in the last period of the intertemporal 
equilibrium there is no production of capital goods, there is no need for a 
demonstration of the equivalence of the equilibrium conditions of atemporal and 
intertemporal equilibria: the equilibrium conditions are necessarily the same because 
they need no change, all they need is a reinterpretation of the symbols.   
For production decisions, the reinterpretability can be carried further; the 
intertemporal equilibrium conditions can be shown to be equivalent to those of an 
atemporal equilibrium without intermediate goods, i.e. atemporal and acapitalistic. 
One can define a vertically integrated production method for a good as one in which 
the direct produced inputs of the good are replaced by one possible vector of inputs 
sufficient to produce those inputs, and so on backwards until one reaches the initial 
period of the equilibrium[
38]. In this way one obtains a vertically integrated 
production method where all intermediate inputs have disappeared, the sole inputs are 
non-produced inputs of the several periods (by which I mean not produced inside the 
equilibrium: labour and land services of the several periods, and initial capital goods: 
the latter will be reinterpreted as types of labour or of land in the atemporal 
reinterpretation). Given the (discounted) rentals of all non-produced inputs, the 
(discounted) cost of producing the good with that vertically integrated production 
method is the cost of its inputs, and a hypothetical vertically integrated firm will 
choose, among all vertically integrated methods to produce that good, the one (or one 
of the ones) that minimizes the cost; under competition and constant returns to scale, 
the same result will emerge even when there is no vertically integrated firm, because 
                                                                                                                                             
equilibria do not exclude the possibility that two goods have both zero price relative to the 
numéraire good or to a group of other goods, while having a positive rate of exchange 
between them. Imagine that in a pure exchange atemporal economy some consumers have 
endowments of goods A and B and desire also goods C and D, while goods C and D are only 
held by a second group of consumers who do not care for A nor B; imagine that the excess 
supply of both goods A and B causes both their prices relative to goods C and D to fall to 
zero; once the prices of both A and B in terms of C or D have become zero, this means that 
the consumers of the first group cannot obtain goods C or B, but they still have their 
endowments of goods A and B (because by assumption the owners of goods C and D do not 
desire A nor B) and they can exchange them at a perfectly well defined ratio; if these 
consumers realize that they cannot obtain anything by offering A or B in exchange for C or 
D, it is conceivable that they resign themselves to exchanging and consuming A and B, so 
that these goods are fully utilized and have a well-defined exchange rate between them. The 
same will hold for the exchange rate between C and D, whose owners actually form a 
separate economy from the owners of A and B. This shows that in atemporal equilibria too, a 
good A can be non-scarce relative to a group of goods and be scarce relative to another 
group of goods. 
38 I am implicitly excluding joint production here. I leave the study of the implications of 
joint production to others more competent than me on this issue.                    
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competition implies that produced inputs are sold at their minimum average cost, and 
therefore a firm that were to produce its inputs internally would be unable to obtain 
them at a lower cost than by buying them. If then we consider an atemporal economy 
where production factors are only the non-produced factors of the intertemporal 
economy (of course reinterpreted as atemporal inputs) and the available production 
methods are the vertically integrated methods available to the intertemporal economy, 
then for each vector of factor rentals (interpreted as discounted in the intertemporal 
economy, not discounted in the atemporal one) technical choices and minimum 
average costs of produced goods will be the same mathematically (only the 
interpretation will be different) as in the intertemporal economy. The equilibrium 
conditions for the production sector will be then equivalent, even if not formally 
identical because the intermediate goods will only appear explicitly in the 
intertemporal economy. 
Thus, for example, suppose that in an intertemporal economy unassisted labour 
and land of time zero produce a circulating capital good of type α at time 1 which, 
together with labour and land of time 1, produces a circulating capital good of type β 
at time 2 which, together with labour and land of time 2, produces a consumption 
good C at time 3; suppose all these processes are characterized by fixed technical 
coefficients as follows (the symbol * stands for 'together with' and the symbol → 
stands for 'produce'): 
Lα * Tα → 1 unit of capital good α 
Lβ * Tβ * αβ → 1 unit of capital good β 
Lc * Tc * βc → 1 unit of consumption good C. 
L stands for labour, T for land; technical coefficients per unit of product are 
shown on the left-hand side of the arrows. The subscripts refer to the product, for 
example αβ is the input of capital good α per unit of output of capital good β. Then 
we can also say that in order to produce 1 unit of consumption good C one needs Lc 
and Tc units of labour and land one period earlier, βcLβ and βcTβ units of labour and 
land two periods earlier, and βcαβLα and βcαβTα units of labour and land three 
periods earlier. Putting  
βcαβLα= L0,   
βcαβTα= T0,   
βcLβ= L1,  
βcTβ= T1,  
Lc=L2,  
Tc=T2,  
one can write the ‘vertically integrated’ version of the production method of C: 
L0 * T0 * L1 * T1 * L2 * T2 →  1 unit of consumption good C. 
By interpreting these six factors as, for example, three different types of labour 
and three different types of land one obtains an atemporal and acapitalistic production 
method formally identical to the vertically integrated intertemporal method.  
If the efficient production methods of each output of time t via inputs of time t-
1 can be represented via a constant-returns-to-scale production function with smooth                    
 28  
strictly convex isoquants, then one can derive a vertically integrated production 
function, and hence an atemporal acapitalistic production function, with the same 
properties. If there are several alternative intertemporal methods available to produce 
the same final good, each one of them characterized by fixed coefficients, the 
atemporal equivalent is simply a series of 'activities', generating activity-analysis 
isoquants that eliminate the inefficient methods.[
39] 
The above means that in intertemporal economies too there is no need 
explicitly to consider intermediate goods; one can derive ‘vertically integrated’ 
production functions of ‘final’ goods in terms of non-produced factors alone, 
formally analogous to those of atemporal acapitalistic economies, by utilizing the 
vertically integrated production methods. When, in the ‘factor tâtonnement’, demands 
for non-produced inputs are derived from the demands for ‘final’ goods and from 
given rentals of the non-produced inputs, the thing might be equivalently 
accomplished through the use of the ‘vertically integrated’ production functions. 
Coming to consumers, under the assumption of no savings in the last period 
one can reinterpret their intertemporal utility maximization as an atemporal one, the 
                                              
39 On this issue there is a statement by Garegnani which I would like to be further 
clarified, concerning the existence or not of marginal products. He writes (2003: 133; also 
2000: 430): "Despite our assumption that all alternative methods of production require the 
same three factors, there is no assurance that marginal products, even of the discontinuous 
kind, will exist." And in the attached 2003 endnote 42 he explains: “Marginal products, 
whether of the discontinuous or the continuous variety, require that the available techniques 
be susceptible of being ordered so that they can be made to differ by the quantity of only one 
factor at a time. That, it seems, cannot generally be done when the factors are more than two: 
weighted averages of the different methods available which could give the above result will 
not make general economic sense, since it would be an exception when the methods entering 
such averages could coexist.” (2003, p. 164; also 2000, p. 430, fn. 53). The second sentence 
of this endnote appears to assume that the alternative methods consist of a finite number of 
fixed-coefficients methods, and thus it appears insufficient to deny the existence of marginal 
products when production functions are differentiable. But even in the case of a finite 
number of alternative fixed-coefficients methods, I am unable to understand Garegnani's 
point. When there are three factors (as in the model Garegnani uses in 2000 and 2003), of 
course one needs the simultaneous use of at least three alternative methods in order to be 
able to vary the employment of only one factor at a time in the production of a good. But the 
construction of discrete marginal products is not different from the one in the two-factors 
case. For a given employment of the first factor, one can derive output as an increasing 
function of the quantities employed of the other two, obtaining a kinked concave surface 
whose level curves are activity-analysis kinked isoquants; if the amount of the second factor 
is fixed too, one obtains a kinked total productivity curve of the third factor, that yields the 
marginal product of the factor as a step function of the amount employed. The three rentals 
of the factors will determine the minimum-cost method or convex set of methods; the 
equality between all three rentals and marginal products will mean that if one draws 
isoquants in three-dimensional space the isocost plane is tangent to a facet of a kinky 
isoquant, and this can be considered accidental; but even if an edge or a vertex of the kinky 
isoquant is optimal, each rental will be included in the discontinuity between two marginal 
products, in perfect analogy with the case with two factors only.                     
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discounted prices as atemporal prices, and their endowments of dated non-produced 
factors as endowments of atemporal factors, in an obvious way on which I think I 
need not dwell. Again, it is only a matter of reinterpreting the symbols; nothing 
changes in the equations that consumer behaviour is assumed to satisfy. 
A complication in the reinterpretation of intertemporal equilibria as atemporal 
equilibria arises if one assumes, as Schefold (1997, p. 462) does, that in the final 
period of the finite-horizon intertemporal equilibrium there is production of an 
exogenously given vector of (capital) goods, that do not enter the representative 
consumer’s utility function. In the atemporal economy the existence of such a 
component of output can be justified by assuming, for example, that it is a tribute to 
be paid to a nasty foreign nation in order to avoid being invaded, or that it is a 
medicine necessary for the representative consumer’s survival: Schefold’s (1997) 
proof of existence, uniqueness and optimality of equilibrium then implies that in 
equilibrium the resources going to produce that vector are such as to minimize the 
loss of utility of the representative consumer. (If there were several heterogeneous 
consumers, determinateness of equilibrium would be endangered by the different 
effects of subtracting the resources necessary for the production of that vector from 
one consumer rather than from another one, and some arbitrary assumption would be 
necessary to surmount this problem, but the single-consumer assumption eliminates 
the difficulty.) Under such a reinterpretation, again there is no need to alter the 
equilibrium equations, hence no mathematical demonstration of the formal 
equivalence of the intertemporal and of the atemporal equilibrium conditions is 
necessary, they are the same by assumption[
40].   
I conclude that on the uniqueness issue the known theorems on atemporal 
equilibria are also valid for finite-horizon Arrow-Debreu intertemporal equilibria 
(that make the Second Assumption).  
Therefore if the assumptions on consumer preferences are such as to guarantee 
uniqueness in Garegnani’s 2000 model reinterpreted as an atemporal economy, then 
there will be uniqueness for the intertemporal original interpretation too. On the 
uniqueness issue concerning Garegnani’s 2000 model, Mandler and Schefold appear 
to be right and Garegnani wrong. 
 
13. As an aside, since sometimes the theorems on existence, uniqueness and 
stability of equilibrium are formulated for atemporal and acapitalistic economies (i.e. 
without intermediate goods), it may be opportune to add the following consideration 
on the applicability of those theorems to intertemporal economies. The 
                                              
40 Schefold (2008, p. 174) has recourse to a mathematical demonstration because he has 
specified the equilibrium conditions for Garegnani’s model (p. 134) in a way different from 
the more usual and general one for atemporal models and he wants to show that the two 
specifications are equivalent; he might also have simply reinterpreted the former 
specification without manipulating it at all.                    
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disappearance, in the ‘vertically integrated’ representation of intertemporal 
production methods, of the intermediate (i.e. capital) goods produced inside the 
equilibrium takes it for granted that intermediate goods are produced and utilized in 
the correct amounts, and thus it prevents the consideration of disequilibria on the 
markets for these intermediate goods. Thus the ‘vertically integrated’ representation 
of production is inappropriate for the study of the stability of the markets for 
intermediate goods (and hence, as already noted, for the study of stability problems 
arising in savings-investment markets of intermediate periods).  
But for the determination of the equilibria, the ‘vertically integrated’ 
representation would not cause problems. Equilibrium on a market requires either 
equality of supply and demand, or excess supply and a zero price. The vertically 
integrated representation assumes equality between supply and demand for the 
intermediate goods, so if there is equilibrium with such a representation there is also 
equilibrium with the explicit consideration of the supplies and demands for 
intermediate goods. Hence the sole danger is that the vertically integrated 
representation may cause us to miss out some equilibria where there isn't equality 
between supply and demand for some intermediate goods. But in these equilibria for 
these intermediate goods there can only be excess supply. Then their price i.e. their 
cost of production must be zero; this must mean that all the factors which are 
employed in their production have zero rentals, so if we reduce the amounts produced 
of the intermediate goods in excess supply to just what is demanded, this will only 
mean an even greater excess supply of those factors, with no change in prices nor on 
any other markets. Hence in this case we can equivalently formulate the equilibrium 
as an equilibrium with equality between supply and demand for all intermediate 
goods, and with some non-produced factors in excess supply and zero rentals; but 
then this equilibrium is among those describable through the 'vertically integrated' 
representation.  
The above seems sufficient to conclude that the theorems on existence and 
uniqueness of atemporal and acapitalistic economies do apply to intertemporal 
economies (where the three Assumptions hold). With even more reason they will 
apply to Garegnani’s 2000-2003 model, where there are no intermediate goods. 
 
14. But how is the equilibrium-conditions equivalence between intertemporal 
and atemporal model achieved? By having, in the intertemporal model, not only 
complete futures markets but also a finite horizon with no production of capital goods 
in the last period.  
(An exogenous vector of zero-utility goods produced in the last period, like 
vector f in Schefold (1997), can be useful for certain analytical purposes but cannot 
be considered truly to represent production of capital goods: the choice of which 
capital goods to produce cannot be independent of their prospective profitability, 
which cannot be independent of what has happened up to then and is therefore 
endogenous – and in fact Schefold uses f essentially in order to prove “that steady 
states of finite duration may be represented as intertemporal equilibria” (1997, p. 483;                    
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cf. also p. 462), in which case the vector although formally taken as given is actually 
fixed ex-post as precisely the one required by the steady state –; therefore such a 
vector, even when assumed to exist, is best considered a special case of rigid demand 
for consumption goods; so the relevant case to confront is the one with only 
consumption goods produced in the last period.)  
Mandler’s dismissal of Schefold’s and Garegnani’s contentions has been made 
possible by the fact that Schefold and Garegnani have conceded these assumptions in 
their formal critical models. I contend that it is because of these assumptions that a 
“well behaved” consumer side (i.e. satisfying the weak axiom) guarantees uniqueness 
of the intertemporal equilibrium, or at least convexity of the set of equilibrium prices 
and uniqueness of productions. In support of this contention I will produce a 
numerical example of a single-consumer intertemporal equilibrium where in the last 
period considered there is production of an endogenously determined vector of capital 
goods. Obviously this vector cannot be derived from the demands for the goods that 
these capital goods will produce (the futures markets for these goods do not exist), it 
will be determined by considerations that appear plausible and much closer to how 
actual economies work than complete futures markets over an infinite horizon, or 
than no production of capital goods in the last period.  
I shall construct an intertemporal model over a finite number of periods with a 
representative consumer, where the economy does not end with the last period, only 
futures markets end, so in the last period there is production of capital goods; their 
total value is given by Say’s Law plus an assumption on savings; but which capital 
goods will be produced depends on the real wage inside the equilibrium, because this 
determines the wage expected for the first period beyond the equilibrium’s horizon (I 
assume it is the same real wage) and the prices expected for that same period (I 
assume they are the minimum-cost-prices associated with the expected wage and the 
last-period prices of capital goods, and with the choice of technique that maximizes 
the expected rate of return on investment). Labour supply for the last production 
cycle inside the equilibrium is assumed to be the result of a choice between leisure 
and consumption that obeys usually-shaped indifference curves and therefore 
depends on the wage, and what I show with a numerical example is that as the wage 
changes the capital goods produced can change such that it is possible that the 
consumer’s choices between consumption and leisure are such that the demand for 
labour and supply of consumption can coincide with the supply of labour and demand 
for consumption at more than one wage rate. Thus what I shall produce can be 
described as a mixed intertemporal-temporary equilibrium model with savings in the 
last period, identical consumers, and shared expectations on subsequent prices, and I 
show that simple assumptions suffice to point to the possibility of multiple equilibria. 
Since both the assumption that the economy ends after a finite number of periods, and 
the assumption of complete futures markets over the infinite future, are more than 
faintly ridiculous, I think that any attempt to make general equilibrium theory                    
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somewhat more realistic must accept the introduction of some elements of temporary 
equilibrium, and then my result shows some implications of such a modification. 
The multiplicity of equilibria in the numerical example will concern the choice 
of the representative consumer between consumption and leisure, an aspect absent 
from the articles I am discussing where labour supply has been assumed rigid; so it 
may be useful to illustrate first why the choice between leisure and consumption is 
unable to produce multiple atemporal equilibria when there is a representative 
consumer, in spite of the possibility of backward-bending labour supply; this 
background will make it easier to understand why multiple equilibria connected with 
the choice between consumption and leisure become possible if some aspects of the 
model are changed, e.g. if the equilibrium is a long-period one with a given value 
endowment of capital, or if in an otherwise neo-Walrasian intertemporal equilibrium 
one does not reduce all demand to consumption demand.   
 
15. Consider an ‘atemporal’ competitive production economy where two 
factors, labour and land, which can be combined in variable proportions, produce a 
single consumption good. The many consumers are identical both in preferences and 
in endowments, and hence a representative consumer exists. Land supply is rigid. The 
representative consumer spends all her income on the consumption good. The 
consumption good is the numéraire. The real wage rate w and the real rent rate ρ are 
tied together by the condition that extraprofits are zero.   
The standard marginalist analysis of this economy assumes that the available 
methods of production form a differentiable production function c=f(N,B) 
homogeneous of degree 1, where N is labour employment and B is land employment; 
the real wage rate w and the real rent rate ρ are equal to the respective marginal 
products, and therefore by the product-exhaustion theorem firms make zero 
extraprofits. If land is fully employed, then the economy-wide marginal product 
curve of labour is also its demand curve; it is realistic to assume that marginal 
products become zero for a sufficiently high factor proportion; then, if labour 
employment is measured on the abscissa and the real wage on the ordinate, the labour 
demand curve has initially a horizontal stretch, then decreases, and becomes 
horizontal (coinciding with the abscissa) to the right of the point where labour’s 
marginal product becomes zero. A backward-bending labour supply curve can have 
multiple intersections with the labour demand curve, entailing multiple equilibria; but 
this cannot happen if there is a representative consumer with convex indifference 
curves, because the PPF (production possibility frontier) is convex and the 
(Walrasian) budget constraint of the single consumer is tangent to the PPF; hence if 
there are two equilibria, the budget surface corresponding to each equilibrium passes 
above the other equilibrium,  violating the weak axiom of revealed preferences. 
Let me give a graphical confirmation of this statement. I adopt the Walrasian 
specification of the budget constraint, i.e. that specification which assumes that                    
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consumers count on an income equal to the value of the factors they supply and not to 
the value of the factors which find purchasers. For the purpose of determining the 
equilibria (rather than out-of-equilibrium behaviour), this specification does not make 
any difference relative to the more satisfactory one, because the equilibria are the 
same. And it is easier to use graphically. 
The essential point is that, if there are two factors, but one consumer, this 
consumer owns them both; therefore her income derives both from wages and from 
land rent. If we draw the labour total productivity function C=F(N), where C is the 
production of the consumption good and N is labour employment, the real wage is 
given by its derivative, but the remainder of the product goes anyway to the consumer 
as land rent.  
In order to consider the consumer choice between leisure λ and corn, we 
simply re-draw the function C=F(N) from right to left, as C=F(λmax–λ), a concave 
decreasing curve representing the economy's PPF between leisure (which can be at 
most λmax, e.g. 24 hours a day) and consumption: then for each value of the real wage 
the budget constraint is the line tangent to this curve, with a slope equal to –w. Thus 
in Fig. 2 let us suppose that the real wage is such that the (non-equilibrium) budget 
constraint is as drawn, tangent to the production possibility frontier in E. Let us 
demonstrate that this is indeed the (Walrasian) budget constraint: the income from 
supplying labour is indicated by the λmaxF line; for example labour income is AG 
when labour supply is λmax–A; the income going to the fixed land supply is GE, 
determined by the marginal product of land when labour demand is A[
41]; therefore as 
labour supply increases, at the given factor rentals the consumer's total income varies 










                                              
41 . The point of tangency of the budget constraint with the production possibility frontier 
indicates the intended production choice of firms at that wage rate and at the associated land 
rent rate equal to the marginal product of land when the supply of land is fully utilized 
(owing to constant returns to scale firms must make zero profits, so land too must be 
receiving its marginal product); therefore it also indicates the demand for labour, e.g. the 
segment from A to λmax when the tangency is in E in Fig. 1.                    
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The budget constraint is therefore such that the consumer choice can never be 
inside the production possibility frontier. Consider the (unique) equilibrium point D 
in Fig. 2. When the real wage changes from its equilibrium level, unless the PPF has 
a kink just in D the tangency point moves away from D and the consumer's optimum 
choice necessarily moves to a higher indifference curve (e.g. to point B) and therefore 
cannot touch again the concave PPF; and even if the budget constraint still goes 
through the equilibrium point (because that point is a kink of the PPF), unless the 
indifference curve through D too has a kink in that point any rotation of the budget 
constraint will again move the consumer's optimum choice to a higher indifference 
curve: so the equilibrium allocation is necessarily unique if indifference curves are 
strictly convex and the production possibility frontier is concave(
42), or if indifference 
curves are convex and the production possibility frontier is strictly concave; and the 
equilibrium relative prices too are unique, except for kinks of both the indifference 









                                              
42 . Constant returns to scale for the industries suffice to ensure this.                    
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In order to grasp the difference made by the assumption of a single consumer, 
I draw in Fig. 3 a possible “offer curve” (the broken curve AD[
43]) of the consumer 
between leisure time and consumption as the real wage changes when she does not 
own the land and her sole endowment is leisure time: in this case the budget line 
always goes through λmax, and becomes less and less steep as the wage rate decreases; 
for this case I assume a downward-sloping offer curve, i.e. such that the supply of 
labour would be backward-bending if the consumer did not own the land, with a 
possibility of multiple equilibria. The same Figure shows how that offer curve 
changes when the same consumer, with the same indifference curves, also owns the 
land: then the budget constraint is always tangent to the PPF, so the offer curve 
becomes the curve ABC which implies that the unique equilibrium is in B: along the 
portion of the offer curve from A to B labour demand is less than supply (the supply 
is to the left of the point where the budget constraint touches the PPF), while along 
the portion from B to C labour demand is always greater than supply(
44).  
                                              
43 As an aside, the term “offer curve” would be better replaced by “choice curve” since 
the points of the curve describe the consumer’s choices (demands), not her “offers” (net 
supplies) which are only indirectly shown as differences between endowments and demands.  
44 On the contrary, when the offer curve is AD, generated by budget constraints through 
λmax because leisure is the sole endowment (land belongs to other consumers), the 
equilibrium points are the points on the offer curve on or below the PPF, vertically aligned 
with the points on the PPF corresponding to the same wage, and there may well be several of 
                                                                                                                       %                    
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Of course there is no reason why indifference curves should be strictly convex; 
but the multiple equilibria that can arise owing to such a cause are not due to the 
presence of capital, and therefore we can neglect them. For analogous reasons we can 
neglect the multiple equilibria that can arise owing to increasing returns and can 
render the PPF convex.  
As far as I can see the above considerations generalize to any atemporal 
production economy. The same drawings can be interpreted as applying to a 
stationary economy where land is replaced by corn and the PPF shows the possible 
alternatives between leisure time and stationary net corn product. 
 
16.  Non-uniqueness with value capital. When, as in traditional long-period 
marginalist equilibria, the other factor besides labour is value capital, and there is a 
given endowment of value capital (in terms of the consumption good) while prices 
are long-period prices then, even with a single consumer, multiple equilibria are 
possible. This is because the relationship, corresponding to the PPF, between leisure 
and stationary net output of the consumption good is no longer necessarily a concave 
function with the budget constraint tangent to it and shifting leftwards as w decreases.  
This relationship must now be derived as follows. For each real wage, the 
(stationary) economy chooses a technique which implies a certain value of capital per 
unit of labour k, hence an employment of labour per unit of value capital equal to its 
reciprocal, 1/k, and a certain physical net output of consumption good per unit of 
labour  y. The articles in the Cambridge controversy have analyzed the possible 
shapes of these functions of the real wage (or of the rate of profit) for a variety of 
numerical examples. All we need is to derive from these magnitudes how the point 
(leisure, net output per unit of value capital) changes with the real wage. The net 
output per unit of value capital is given by z(w)=y(w)/k(w); leisure is given by λ(w) = 
λmax – 1/k(w).  The locus of points thus obtained in (λ,z) space can be called the 
pseudo-PPF curve corresponding to a given value endowment of capital of 1 unit. For 
each w, through the corresponding point of the pseudo-PPF curve one draws a line 
with slope equal to –w, which indicates the budget constraint of the single consumer 
under a stationariness assumption; if this slope equals the slope of the indifference 
curve through that point, one has an equilibrium.  
But now the points (λ(w),z(w)) corresponding to the changing value of w need 
no longer form a concave curve, and the budget constraint will not be tangent to the 
pseudo-PPF curve, which can have nearly any shape, even crossing itself several 
times. So, more than one point on this pseudo-PPF curve can exhibit equality 
                                                                                                                                             
these. Notice how the elimination of multiple equilibria due to the single consumer does not 
derive from the abolition of the possibility that the supply of labour be a decreasing function 
of the real wage: it still is, along most of the AB portion of the ABC offer curve.                      
 37  
between the slopes of the budget constraint and of the indifference curve through that 
point, i.e. there can be multiple equilibria. 
Table 1 reports the values of 1/k and y/k for selected values of w for the well-
known example developed by Garegnani (1970: Fig. 3, p. 413, and Fig. 7, p.430: for 
the reader’s convenience, Garegnani’s Fig. 3 is reproduced here as Fig. 4). These 
values are appended to the values calculated by Garegnani (1970) in his Table II, p. 
429. 
                                    Table 1 
r   w   y       k     1/k     y/k 
0   0.200   0.200   1.080   0.926   0.185         
2.6   0.175   0.192   0.635   1.575   0.302   
4.1   0.169   0.183   0.393   2.545   0.466 
6.1   0.159   0.175   0.257   3.891   0.681 
8.3   0.151   0.167   0.184   5.435   0.908 
10.5   0.144   0.159   0.148   6.757   1.074 
12.9   0.129   0.152   0.179   5.587   0.849 
14.4   0.105   0.159   0.379   2.639   0.420 
15.1   0.083   0.167   0.552   1.812   0.303 
15.9   0.061   0.175   0.715   1.399   0.245   
16.9   0.041   0.183   0.850   1.177   0.215 
17.5   0.026   0.192   0.947   1.056   0.203 





                                             [Insert   Fig. 4  about here] 
                      [Reproduction of Fig. 3 p. 413 from Garegnani 1970] 
 
 
The endowment λmax of total leisure time can be fixed arbitrarily, here I assume 
it is 10 for ease of calculation. The values thus calculated of λmax–1/k and of y/k are 
plotted in Fig. 5, and are connected by a curve that reproduces the behaviour of the 
pseudo-PPF curve, with the corresponding value of w derivable from Table 1, and the 
corresponding budget line shown by the thin straight segment through the point. The 
resulting pseudo-PPF curve is strikingly different from the convex curve one would 
obtain with given endowments of physically specified factors. It is apparent that it 
would be easy to draw families of indifference curves that are tangent to the budget 
lines in more than one point of the pseudo-PPF curve; three such tangent indifference 
curves are drawn in Fig. 5. Multiplicity of equilibria is no longer impossible. 
 
[Insert Fig. 5 about here] 
 
The reason why multiple equilibria are possible is that the budget line through                    
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some points of the pseudo-PPF curve passes below some other points of the curve, so 
a convex indifference curve that goes through a point A of that curve and is tangent to 
the budget line through that point can pass below other points of the curve, an 
impossibility with a concave PPF curve with budget lines tangent to it. Thus in Fig. 5 
nothing prevents both the indifference curve through point A and the indifference 
curve through point B (shown as dotted curves) from being both tangent to the 
respective budget lines through those two points. 
 
17. The possibility of multiple equilibria thus obtained is due to two 
differences from the usual formalization of intertemporal equilibria: 1) the value 
specification of the capital endowment, 2) the presence of an endogenously 
determined production of capital goods in the last (coinciding here with the first) 
period considered. Now I will try to show that the second difference is alone 
sufficient to obtain multiple equilibria. 
Since there is production of, and hence demand for, capital goods in the last 
period of the intertemporal equilibrium I will consider, this demand cannot be derived 
from the demands for the products that those capital goods might produce: the futures 
markets of those products do not exist. On the other hand, one cannot take this final 
demand for capital goods as given: it clearly will depend on what investors expect to 
be profitable in the future, and this cannot be independent of what they have observed 
to be going on in the markets where equilibrium is being established. It is therefore 
indispensable to make some assumption as to how the vector of capital goods 
demanded in the last period, in other words investment, is determined. One can 
distinguish two issues here; I announce my solutions in intuitive terms first, the 
precise solutions will become clear when I specify the model.  
The first issue is the total amount (total value) of gross investment. Since the 
purpose of the exercise is to prove the possibility of multiple equilibria while 
remaining as close as possible to neoclassical reasonings, it seems legitimate here to 
assume Say’s Law, that is, investment determined by savings. There remains to 
determine savings. In keeping with a long tradition in neoclassical theorizing, I will 
assume that consumers (in fact, the representative consumer) wish to perform no net 
savings; they want stationariness, so they want the capital stock to remain unaltered. 
This assumption is not in line with usual contemporary theorizing, that generally 
assumes a given rate of discount of future consumption; but the latter assumption is 
not less arbitrary than mine, and anyway I believe that, once the basic problem has 
been made clear through as simple an example as possible, then modifying the 
example by introducing a propensity to net savings will not be difficult and will not 
alter the conclusions. My assumption on the amount of investment is, in conclusion,                    
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that it is the one required by stationariness[
45]. 
The second issue is the composition of investment. I will assume that, after an 
initial period zero where production of capital goods is by labour alone but very 
inefficient, production can utilize either one or another of two types of capital good, 
each one of which produces the consumption good and itself (as in Garegnani 1970), 
and that investment will be in the type of capital good that, on the basis of the given 
real wage (which is expected to last) and of an expectation of product prices 
determined by minimum average cost, promises to yield the higher rate of profit in 
subsequent periods. The assumption that the given real wage is expected to last 
appears reasonable, in view of the rather small difference between rates of change of 
real wages and rates of change in labour productivity in actual economies most of the 
time, and of the fact that in my model I abstract from technical change so the 
abovementioned “rather small difference” comes to mean a generally very slow 
change of real wages over time. 
 
18. I come to the model. The equilibrium, established at date 0, includes 
markets for good of three dates, 0, 1 and 2; these dates mark the beginning of the 
respective periods. At dates zero and one, demand for the consumption good is zero. 
At date zero the sole factor is labour supplied in fixed amount, which produces either 
capital goods of type α or capital goods of type β according to fixed-coefficients 
methods; capital goods come out at date 1; the stock of capital good of type α 
available at date 1 will be indicated as K1α, the other stock as K1β. Either kind of 
capital good, together with labour, is capable of producing itself, or the single 
consumption good corn, according to a single fixed-coefficients method for each 
production, specific to the capital good; production takes one period. From date 1 
onwards for some reason the production methods adopted in period zero become 
unfeasible, and one must produce with the methods that use one or the other capital 
good. Thus apart from period 0 the available production methods are like in the two-
techniques case of Garegnani 1970 article. The futures markets for date 2 include the 
market for corn, that comes out of the production of period 1 in amount C2, and the 
                                              
45 My assumption can be rationalized in the same way as was done by traditional 
marginalist authors, who considered capital accumulation to be sufficiently slow relative to 
the speed with which the composition of capital can adjust, to make it legitimate to assume 
an adjusted composition while treating the total capital stock as constant (some quotations to 
such an effect are in Petri, 2004, p. 119). Or it can be rationalized by assuming that from 
period 1 onwards the myriad identical consumers (cf. the next footnote) last one period and 
each one bequeathes his capital to his son, an identical one-period consumer for whose 
utility the father cares but only to the point of desiring that the son starts with as much 
wealth as the father. Anyway I can see no reason why introducing a propensity to net savings 
should make it impossible to reach the results I will reach.                     
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markets for capital goods, whose supplies will be indicated as K2α and K2β; the 
demands for them constitute investment and I will assume supplies equal to demands; 
there is no futures market for labour of period 2. Demand for labour in period 1, LD1, 
depends on how much C2 is produced and how (it can be produced with either 
method), and on how much is demanded of K2α and of K2β; this demand for labour 
can be compared with the supply of labour, that depends on the consumer’s choice 
between C2 and leisure in period 1. This choice between leisure and consumption 
depends uniquely on the real (corn) wage w. The absence of futures markets for 
labour of date 2 means that the myriad identical consumers[
46] cannot determine what 
will happen to labour employment in period 2; they can only determine their labour 
supply choices for period 1; their preference for stationariness of the capital stock 
determines their individually taken saving decisions without any awareness of what 
this will imply for future labour employment[
47].  
Let K1α (respectively, K1β) stand for the amount of capital goods of type α 
(respectively, of type β) produced by the full employment of labour of date zero. Let 
us choose units such that K1α=K1β=1.Then the price of one unit of capital good of date 
1 of either type must be the same. Having adopted these units for the capital goods, 
let the technical coefficients be defined thus (k stands for capital, c for corn or 
consumption good, l for labour): 
kcα ⊕ lcα → 1 unit of consumption good (with method α) 
kkα ⊕ lkα → 1 unit of capital good of type α 
kcβ ⊕ lcβ → 1 unit of consumption good (with method β) 
kkβ ⊕ lkβ → 1 unit of capital good of type β 
Let Pit stand for the discounted price of good i of date t, while pit stands for its 
undiscounted price. Corn of date 2 is the numéraire, i.e. Pc2=pc2=1. The discounted 
price of corn of date 2 produced with method α is 
Pc2α = 1 = W2 lcα + Pk1α kcα. 
The undiscounted price, with wages paid in arrears, is 
pc2α = 1 = w lcα + (1+r1α) pk1α kcα. 
Because corn of date 2 is the numéraire and wages are paid in arrears, it is 
                                              
46 The existence of a representative consumer should not make one forget that we are 
discussing competitive economies, where therefore the representative consumer has no 
market power; this must be due to the fact that consumers are many, and the representative 
consumer results e.g. from their being identical in tastes and in endowments. 
47 No doubt this assumption will be found disturbing by economists accustomed to 
assume perfect foresight or complete futures markets over the infinite future, but realism 
obliges one to admit that in market economies individual decisions are taken independently 
of the collective results coming out of them. More analytically, if one assumes a finite 
decision horizon in an economy, it is inevitable that disequilibria may arise in subsequent 
periods.                     
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W2=w. Strictly analogous price equations of course hold for corn of date 2 produced 
with method β. It is unnecessary[
48] to distinguish pk1α from r1α, or pkβ from r1β, 
because all we need is to determine which capital good is preferred to produce C2, to 
such an end what is important is that the minimum-cost method will be preferred, and 
for that Pk1 suffices. The two capital goods require the same amount of period-0 
labour to be produced so they must have the same price, so for each given Pk1 and 
given real wage the preferred method will be the one that yields the smaller sum of 
labour cost and capital cost; since C2 is the numéraire its price is 1, and, because of 
the zero-extraprofit implication of constant returns to scale, whatever part of the 
value of C2 that does not go to pay wages must go to pay date-0 labour in the form of 
price of date-1 capital goods; this means that for a given w the minimum-cost method 
is the one that allows paying the higher Pk1. Minimizing the price of C2 for a given 
Pk1 and a given real wage implies maximizing Pk1 for a price of C2 equal to 1 and a 
given  w. The implication is that for the production of C2, choice of production 
method will be guided by which method allows paying the higher Pk1 on the basis of 
the given w. It is 
Pk1α=(1 - w lcα) / kcα 
Pk1β=(1 - w lcβ) / kcβ. 
The common discounted price of the capital goods of date 1, that we can 
indicate simply as Pk1, will be the greater of the two. Therefore for w=0 the preferred 
method for the production of C2 is the one with the smaller coefficient kc, and if for 
example this is method α i.e. if kcα<kcβ, then as w rises there can be a switch of 
method in the production of C2 only if lcβ<lcα. 
If, for a given w, method α is preferred for the production of C2, this does not 
mean that only capital good α will be produced by date-0 labour. If investment 
demand at date 2 is for capital good β, then date-0 labour will produce some of both 
capital goods, the production of capital good β of date 1 being required for the 
production of capital good β of date 2.   
Can this happen? It depends on what determines the type of capital goods in 
which there is investment at date 2. I assume that individual producers (who borrow 
the consumers’s savings[
49]), when deciding the type of capital in which to invest, are 
led by their experience to assume that product price is determined by average cost; 
furthermore, as already said, they assume that the real wage is not going to change; 
therefore they assume that the undiscounted price of corn of date 3 will be 
                                              
48 And actually impossible in this model, where there is no consumption good of date 1, 
and capital goods have no direct utility and therefore there is no utility-based choice among 
capital goods of date 1 and 2 that might allow the determination of r1. 
49 Alternatively one can imagine that capital goods are bought by the consumers 
themselves, who learn from consultants the capital goods that it is most convenient to 
purchase.                    
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pc3α = 1 = w lcα + (1+ r2α) pk2α kcα 
if method α is adopted, and 
pc3β = 1 = w lcβ + (1+ r2β) pk2β kcβ 
if method β is adopted.  
Since corn is the numéraire and its undiscounted price is 1, if pk2α and pk2β can 
be determined beforehand then the two rates of return r2α and r2β are the sole 
unknowns in these two equations and can be determined and compared. The previous 
determination of pk2α and pk2β is indeed possible, but there is a complication: they 
depend on which method is chosen for the production of C2, because that choice 
determines Pk1. Suppose it is method α; then Pk1=Pk1α for either capital good of date 
1. Let pk2αα stand for the undiscounted cost of production of capital good α of date 2 
when C2 is produced with method α, let pk2αβ stand for the cost of production of a unit 
of capital good β of date 2 when C2 is produced with method α (so the sequence of 
indices  αβ indicates that the methods preferred for the production of C2 and 
successively of C3 are first α and then β), and analogously for pk2ββ and pk2βα (the last 
one is the cost of production of K2α when Pk1=Pk1β). Then the equations for the 
undiscounted prices of capital goods of date 2 become 
pk2αα = w lkα + Pk1α kkα, 
pk2αβ = w lkβ +  Pk1α kkβ, 
pk2ββ = w lkβ +  Pk1β kkβ, 
pk2βα = w lkα +  Pk1β kkα, 
where Pk1α=(1 - w lcα)/kcα is the payment to capital goods of date 1, whichever the 
type, when C2 is produced with method α, and analogously for Pk1β; thus, for a given 
w, one must distinguish four costs of production of corn of date 3, and four expected 
rates of return if the price of that corn is 1, depending on the sequence of methods. 
For brevity I shall indicate this sequence as αα, αβ,  ββ, βα where the first letter 
indicates the method used to produce C2, the second letter indicates the method (or 
technique[
50]) firms intend to use to produce C3 and therefore also the capital good in 
which firms invest at date 2. The equations determining these rates of return are   
pc3αα = 1 = w lcα + (1+ r2αα) [w lkα + kkα (1 - w lcα)/kcα] kcα 
pc3αβ = 1 = w lcβ + (1+ r2αβ)) [w lkβ + kkβ (1 - w lcα)/kcα] kcβ. 
pc3ββ = 1 = w lcβ + (1+ r2ββ)) [w lkβ + kkβ (1 - w lcβ)/kcβ] kcβ. 
pc3βα = 1 = w lcα + (1+ r2βα)) [w lkα + kkα (1 - w lcβ)/kcβ] kcα. 
These equations determine the four possible expected rates of return in the 
                                              
50 It is usual to mean by ‘method’ a direct production process adopted in the production of 
a certain good, and by ‘technique’ a set of methods required to produce both a net product 
and the capital goods directly or indirectly required for that net product. Since production of 
C3 with a method implies use of the corresponding capital good which must have been 
produced in period 1, I could also speak of technique producing C3.                      
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production of corn of date 3. For each level of w, only two of these are relevant, 
because the level of w selects the method preferred for the production of C2, thus if 
this is for example method β, only r2ββ and r2βα need be compared in order to ascertain 
which method will be chosen for the production of C3 and therefore the capital good 
in which firms invest at date 2. I assume that investment will be entirely into the type 
of capital good that yields the higher of the two relevant rates of return. Why 
entirely? Because as long as w is not expected to change, it is reasonable to assume 
that the method chosen for the production of C3 will be presumed by firms to be the 
one yielding the higher rate of return for the production of C4 too. This presumption 
will turn out to be certainly correct if the method chosen for the production of C3 is 
different from the one chosen for the production of C2, because the reason for the 
change is the tendency of relative prices determined by average costs to converge 
toward long-period prices if w remains unchanged, a well known result; so the 
correctness of the change will be confirmed by the subsequent evolution of prices. On 
the other hand, suppose that method α is preferred for the production of C2; it is 
conceivable that method α may be found again the most convenient one for the 
production of C3 while further extrapolation of the development of prices would show 
that  C4 or C5 should be produced with method β, because the latter is the most 
convenient technique at the long-period prices connected with the given w. But if one 
assumed that in such a case date-2 investment will partly consist of capital goods β 
and partly of capital goods α, one would be assuming something close to perfect 
foresight by assuming that consumers and firms are able to extrapolate what will 
happen in periods more and more into the future, and to trust their extrapolations; 
anyway in the numerical example to be presented this case does not occur. 
The above determines the type of investment once w is given. As to the 
amount of investment, I assume a desire of consumers for a stationary stock of 
capital. This easily determines investment in the sequences αα and ββ. The initial 
stocks of capital, produced by date-0 labour, must be fully utilized in equilibrium. 
Suppose method α is preferred for C2 and for C3. Then only capital good α is 
produced by date-0 labour, its stock is 1 unit, and its full utilization implies 
kcα C2 + kkα K2α =1.  
In this case a stationary physical capital stock can be defined, and it implies 
K2α=K1α=1, so C2=(1 - kkα) / kcα. Let us indicate this amount of C2, associated with 
stationariness when method α is preferred for C2 and for C3, as C2αα: 
C2αα = (1 - kkα) / kcα. 
Analogously 
C2ββ = (1 - kkβ) / kcβ. 
Suppose instead that method α is preferred for C2 but method (technique) β is 
preferred for C3 so date-2 investment consists entirely of capital goods β. Both prices 
and physical type are changing, and furthermore what subsequent wages,                    
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employment and prices will actually be is not certain. Therefore the meaning to be 
attributed to “maintaining capital intact” is necessarily arbitrary to an extent. I choose 
the following. Since a unit of K1α and a unit of K1β cost the same, when both types are 
produced they are perceived by consumers as being the same amount of “real” capital 
as just one unit of either of them; of the two, one type of capital good comes out on 
the basis of firms’ expectations to be more profitable than the other one for 
investment, so it seems reasonable to assume that consumers will consider 1 unit of 
the more profitable capital good to be at least as much “real capital” as the mixture of 
the two types that they considered to be 1 unit of capital at date 1.  So I assume that in 
this case zero net “real” savings will be interpreted by consumers as meaning that it 
must be K2β=1. Then date-1 capital goods must include the amount of capital good β 
necessary to produce K2β=1, which is kkβ; therefore the amount of date-1 capital good 
α is 1 - kkβ and the amount of C2 that can be produced with it satisfies kcα C2 = 1 - kkβ; 
let us indicate as C2αβ this amount of C2 associated with initial preference for method 
α and subsequent preference for method β, that is with the methods I will call it 
sequence αβ: 
C2αβ = (1 - kkβ) / kcα. 
Analogously 
C2ββ = (1-kkβ) / kcβ   
C2βα = (1 - kkα) / kcβ.  
Now we can determine labour demand in period 1: 
LDαα = lcα (1 - kkα) / kcα + lkα 
LDαβ = lcα (1 - kkβ) / kcα + lkβ 
LDββ = lcβ (1 - kkβ) / kcβ + lkβ 
LDβα = lcβ (1 - kkα) / kcβ + lkα. 
 
19. The above equations plus the specified conditions of technical choice 
permit the determination of C2 and of labour demand in period 1 as functions of the 
real corn wage, once the eight technical coefficients kcα, lcα, kkα, lkα, kcβ, lcβ, kkβ, lkβ are 
given. Let us then assume that these coefficients are: 
kcα         lcα         kkα         lkα          kcβ            lcβ        kkβ        lkβ  
1/81      1/9        1/9          1        5/768      13/96     1/8        1 
At w=0, method β is the preferred one for the production of C2 because[
51] 
Pk1β=1/kcβ=153.6>Pk1α=1/kcα=81, and method β remains preferred up to w=6.1525 
where α and β allow paying the same Pk1.  
So for w=6.150 method β is still the preferred one for the production of C2; but 
                                              
51 Calculations have been performed with Maple V Release 3 Student Edition. I can only 
supply upon request a printout of the Maple file, the file itself will not run on current 
Windows machines (I run it on an old Windows Millennium Edition computer).                    
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method  α is preferred for the production of C3 because 1+r2βα=2.847 while 
1+r2ββ=2.744. (The preference for the sequence βα persists as long as 
6.0583<w<6.1525.) At this wage, the sequence being βα, it is C2βα=136.53, 
lDβα=19.49. With the sequence ββ it is C2ββ=134.4, lDββ=19.20, and assuming any 
maximum leisure time λmax>20 one can compare the value of the two leisure-
consumption bundles (λmax-lDβα, C2βα) and (λmax-lDββ, C2ββ); the difference between the 
two values for w=6.150 is  
(C2βα – w·lDβα) – (C2ββ – w·lDββ) = 0.3567.  
If there were equilibrium for this w, the budget line through the equilibrium 
leisure-consumption bundle (the one associated with the βα sequence) would pass 
above the leisure-consumption bundle associated with the ββ sequence. This is as 
neoclassical theory would lead one to expect.  
But for w=3 for example[
52], method β is preferred both for the production of 
C2, and for the production of C3 because 1+r2ββ=6.33 while r2βα=4.11. So the chosen 
sequence is ββ. (And there is no mistake in this case in the choice to produce only 
capital good β, because if the real wage remains constant, β will remain the most 
convenient technique for the production of the consumption good, because at w=3 
technique β is the cost-minimizing technique at long-period prices: in long-period 
technical choice the two techniques reswitch, with α the most profitable one for w<2 
i.e. r>6, and for w>6 i.e. r<2; the graph of the two w(r) curves is in Fig. 6; it is also 
seen that when the sequence is βα, technique α is the cost-minimizing one at long-
period prices because w>6, so in that case too the decision to invest entirely in capital 
good α is justified.) 
 
[Insert Fig. 6 about here] 
  
However, the value of the leisure-consumption bundle associated with the 
sequence  ββ remains inferior to the value of the leisure-consumption bundle 
associated with the sequence βα; for w=3 it is  
(C2βα – w·lDβα) – (C2ββ – w·lDββ) = 1.267. 
This means that if there were equilibrium for w=3, the budget line through the 
chosen leisure-consumption bundle (associated with the ββ sequence) would pass 
below the leisure-consumption bundle associated with the βα sequence. It is then 
perfectly possible that the indifference curve through the leisure-consumption bundle 
of sequence βα may have slope -6.150 there, while at the same time the indifference 
curve through the leisure-consumption bundle of sequence ββ may have slope -3 
there, that is, nothing excludes the existence of two equilibria.  
                                              
52 In fact, for any w<6.0583 down to w=0.                    
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This is shown in Fig. 7, which has leisure, λmax-lD, on the abscissa and C2 on 
the ordinate; assuming now λmax=24 (but as mentioned, any other number greater than 
20 might be chosen), the leisure-consumption bundle associated with sequence βα is 
(24-19.49, 136.53), the one associated with sequence ββ is (24-19.20, 134.4) and it is 
to the South-East of the first one. If one of these points is an equilibrium at the 
corresponding wage rate, the budget line passes through it with slope -w and the 
convex indifference curve through the point is tangent to the budget line. It is 
possible to have tangency at both points, because the budget line through the point 
associated with sequence ββ passes, for an ample range of values of w, below the 
other point. 
 
[Insert Fig. 7 about here] 
 
Thus it is perfectly possible that this economy has two equilibria. The ultimate 
reason is that the last period’s output includes goods whose demand is not determined 
in the same way as for consumption goods. The presence of capital goods makes a 
difference. 
Some of the assumptions made in this numerical example may appear rather 
arbitrary, but I would argue that they are not more arbitrary than currently fashionable 
assumptions (they are certainly less arbitrary than complete futures markets or perfect 
foresight for the indefinite future, or the end of the economy after a finite number of 
periods). Anyway I would be surprised if similar results of possible multiplicity of 
equilibria could not be obtained with different assumptions, as long as there is an 
endogenously determined production of capital goods in the last period. I would 
conjecture that along this route it must also be possible to produce multiple equilibria 
for the case where labour supply is rigid, because it must be possible to find examples 
where the change in investment composition as income distribution changes leaves 
demand for labour unchanged.  
A final caution: the example relies on technology that is associated with 
reswitching, but I have not been able to ascertain whether that is a necessary 
condition for the result. Let me hope that “someone younger and better equipped for 
the task” may succeed in understanding better the general characteristics of the 
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